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The studies on which this monograph is based began in 1954--the
eventful year in which France defeated E.D.C., the treaty creating a
European Defense Ccmwmi ty proposed by French initiative four years
earlier, and the year in which a new French census was taken. These
two events, apparently quite disparate to most observers, seemed to
this writer rather directly related. Living in France during 1954-55,
he was able to detect a false note in the sociological assumptions
about regional France then being put forward by French statesmen and
scholars to "account for" the political decision that rejected E.D.C.
Two major issues were raised by the Great Debate over E.D.C. that
preoccupied French statesmen during the four years leading to a negative
decision, and have continued to preoccupy French scholars in the ten
years since that decision was taken. These issues were and are:
(1) What is regioral France really like, when we move from the imagin-
ative concepts created by gifted writers to the unimaginative facts
reported by census data? (2) Once we establish a data-based analysis of
regional France today, how does this analysis improve our understanding
of French political behav .or dith respect to national issues (e.g., elec-
tions) and international issues (e.g., treaties such as E.D.C.)?
These two issues have remained at the center of our attention in
the decade of sequential studies that are brought together in this
monograph. We began with a close analysis of the E.D.C. defeat and the
explanation of this event put " rward by French statesmen and scholars.
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This effort was sponsored by the Institut d'Etudes Europenes in Paris--
supported jointly by X. I.T. 's Center for International Studies and the
Sorbonne'sa Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques--under the direc-
tion of this writer. Its product was a book which demonstrated, quite
conclusively, that explanations of French political behavior in terms
of French regionalism were bound to be wrong because their assumptions
about French regions were inaccurate. The book proves that the basic
propositions about regional sociology and political decision in France
were demonstrably false. 1
This negative finding--with positive indications that data-based
analysis of census results would produce new insights into the French
sociopolitical process--motivated us to undertake strict statistical
analysis of the 1954 census coupled with case-studies of the "unexpec-
tedly dynamic" southern regions of France in 1960-61, when this writer
was residing in that area as a Visiting Professor at Aix-en-Provence and
Nice. Support for these studies was granted by the M.I.T.-Harvard Joint
Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Unfortunately, the case-studies
made by this writer were lost in transatlantic transit, but the statistical
analysis of 1954 census data under Dr. Morton Gorden produced results of
sufficient interest to warrant a 1961 report to the Joint Center. 2
On the basis of this 1961 report, the Joint Center decided to support
a continuing 1962-63 study that would help nzatain our doctoral candidate,
1. See D. Lerner & Raymond Aron, France Defeats E.D.C. (Praeger,
1957). A French version was published as La Querelle de la C.E.D. (Colin,
1956). A digest of these findings appears as the first of the "lase Studies
presented in Part III of this monograph.
2. D. Lerner & X. Gorden, "Static France and Dynamic France" (mim-
eograph, 1960).
VHoward Rosenthal, in France. His purpose was to obtain and report 1962
census data, while making several fresh "case-studies" of regional France.
The comparison of 1954 and 1962 census data in Part II and the case-studies
of Poujadism and Coammism in Part III were done by Rosenthal. The present
report was edited by Gorden; general supervision of the research and
reporting has been under Lerner.
The present report takes us much deeper into the analysis of the
issues on which our researches began to focus a decade ago: (1) the
sociology of regional France; (2) its relation to national and inter-
national French politics. On the issue of regional sociology, comparison
of the eight-year periods terminating in the census data of 1954 and 1962
has proved fruitful. We have been able to show that during the initial
postwar eight-year period (1946-1954) the modernization of regional
France was associated, not with the cen ientional imagery of "natural
regions," but with the growth and spread of "urban regions. " The latter
have spread in flat contradiction--at least in the southern regions
defined by Toulouse and Marseilles and Nice--to the conventional imagery
of the lazy meridional and the easygoing midi that have long been as-
sumed in French regional studies.
During the second eight-year period (1954-1962), we show that
French modernization has passed completely out of the realm of conventional
regional psychology (based on climate and character)t into the realmn of
modern urban-regional studies (based on urbanism and mobility). Indeed,
the new data show French urbanization to have grown so rapidly that a
sufficient urban base now exists to make further modernization inevitable.
The mass media now reach everywhere in France. As a result--our report
poignantly notes--some old village people still wear black clothing to
continue the traditional "cult of the dead," most young village people
wear colorful shorts and slacks to initiate the modern "cult of the
living. " What our present report suggests, though it cannot prove, is
that French urbanization has reached its "critical mass" in many regions.
The mass media and cheap transp et are carrying on from there. These
make villagers 'urbane" without urbanizing them. They teach villagers
how to look and act like urbanites without making a permanent change of
residence.
Tat French villagers now l.ook, like urbanites is a matter on which
we can only report our visual impressions. That they now act like
urbanites, however, is a matter on which we have decisive data. Behav-
ioral indices are the crux of behavioral science and we therefore focus
our data-reporting on the figures which show "homogeneity" growing through-
out the 90 Departments of France. That the mass media are spreading even
more rapidly through rural than urban France (according to our 1962 cen-
sus data) reveals how effectively the modernization process--or what we
have called the "homogenization" process--is at work. That "urbanized"
farmers do better than "traditional" farmers--as indexed by our agricul-
tural productivity scores--augurs the continuing urbanization of the
rural population.
We come, then, to the view that France is undergoing the major
transformation from a predominantly rural-agricultural society to a
predominantly urban-technological society. On the historical side,
this means that urban exploitation of the peasantry is gone. The era
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of the "delicious ten-cent omelette" is over in regional France. Now-
adays, the omelette will surely cost more than ten cents; and it may not
be delicious. The French peasant has learned double-entry bookkeeping,
and he is determined to come out on the black side of the ledger, however
this may affect his image among "the others. " Besides, now that he has
machines to run and tend, he hasn't "time" for fooling around with
casse-crdthe. Far more important--now that his wife wants a Singer
sewing-machine, his daughter wants a store-bought skirt, his son wants
a scooter, and he wants a car--is how to manage his income taxes. This
is the Lerner Law of Agricultural Productivity: as "rate" increases,
"charm" decreases.
But are we dealing with other issues than "char"? As "rate" in-
creases among French farmers, important innovations appear in their
political behavior. Here the Rosenthal case-studies of Poujadism and
Commxmism are very much in point. They show that both extremes of the
French political continuum--Left as well as Right--now operate indepen-
dently of conventional regional stereotypes and indeed contrary to cur-
rent regional hypotheses. It is demonstrably inaccurate, for example,
to assert that political extremism is higher in "static France.'
Rosenthal documents the contrary assertion in a fascinating way, showing
that Poujade's voters are more numerous in the relatively dynamic de-
partments of regional France--those departments in which the recent ex-
perience of rising growth "rates" has rapidly increased expectations of
future growth. These heightened expectations, when subjected to short-
term frustrations, are the source of extremist political behavior such
v11i
as Poujadism in regional France.
Equally fascinating is Ro i enthal's showing that Commmism in
regional France has entered an "inertial" phase--maintaining itself
by the organizational routinization of existing strongpoints, but adding
few new strongpoints by mobilizing and recruiting fresh elements from
the regional population. Related to this showing are Lerner's 1960-61
studies of "family socialization" among industrial workers in the
southern departments of France. These studies showed that among the
younger children of younger industrial workers--those children attending
primary and early secondary school in 1961--there was a strong shift of
"socialization values" from ideopolitical to socioeconomic standards
of judgment and behavior. As compared with older children of industrial
workers--those already on the job in 1961--the youngsters put far less
value upon "class solidarity" and far more value upon "personal mobility."
On such "solidarity" issues as clothing (the famous blue denim of the
French worker), collective action (through demonstrations or strikes),
and party affiliation (Communist or Socialist) the youngsters were either
indifferent or disdalnful. Moreover, they reported that their parents
encouraged them to ignore "solidarity" activities and focus on "mobilitZ"
activities--such as acquiring through education the skills and manners
that would enable them to "rise" out of the working class into the
higher socioeconomic strata. Independent interviews with the parents
confirmed that industrial workers in the southern departments--and
especially younger parents among the workers--were consciously socializing
their children to downgrade "solidarity" in favor of "mobility" values.
Sic transit gloria proletarii
With the passage of the sturdy paant and the staunch proletarian,
the sociological structure of modern France undergoes very deep trans-
formation. For two centuries or more--from the centralized regime
established in the 18th century to the end of World War II--France was
the A/B country R excellence. France A was Paris, urban, industrial,
comminicative, modern; France B was le province, rural, agricultural,
secretive, arriere. This tidy division of the national life into A/B
compartments--France A acting in the world by skill and France B support-
ing it by labor--has been disrupted by urban technology and is being re-
shaped by urban comnnmicaticn.
In France today, as our studies show, no regional A/Be dichotomy
can readily be plotted on the map. The process of homogenization is
vell advanced--with the result that regional France increasingly looks
and acts like Parisian France. The impact on nationel. politics is
already evident in the inadequacy of conventional categories to explain
recent electoral behavior within France--as in the Poujadist and Cow-
munist movements. The impact on French political behavior in the world
arena--as foreshadowed a decade ago in the E.D.C. and elaborated by
De Gaulle today--remains to be investigated in detail.
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URBAN RIWfIOW AND TEE TRAESFO1WTION OF FRAE
Modernization in a Developed Country
Regionalism as Social Science
Changing France: Mobility and Urbanism
Urbanism and Modernization
Tte Spreading Urban Regions
Toward a Regional Science in France
PART I
UTJBAN RIEIC1S AND THE TRUARFORMATIOU
OF FRA12E*
Modernization in a Deve Cotr
Regionalism has played a large role in French life and thought. 1
The great "natural regions" acquired centuries ago same distinctive
marks which they still bear today--the dairy region of Normandy, the
maritime region of Brittany, the wine regions of the Loire and of the
Rhone.2 Only in the 18th century, according to Tocqueville, did the
heavy hand of centralized government begin to subordinate the proud
traditions of regional differences based on nature--a process completed
by the Napoleonic system in the 19th century. 3 The motive of central-
* We wish to thank the Joint Center for Urban Studies of .I.T. and
- Harvard University for a grant in support of the research on which
this monograph is based.
1. V. Charles-Brun, Leegionalism (Paris, 1911) is the standard account
of traditional regionalism in modern form. A good interwar survey is
R. K. Gooch, egionalism in France (Century, 1931). An enlightening
postwar account, despite its aggressive literary style, is J. P. Gravier,
Paris et le Desert Francais (Paris, 1947).
2. Presses Universitaires de France, in its series "Que Sais-je?", has
published over a dozen regional histories- -including Normandy, Brit-
tany, Alsace, Lorraine, Provence, Savoie, Auvergne, Dauphind--as weU
as of Paris and Lyon.
3. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Double-
day Anchor, 1955), esp. Pt. II, Ch. 2.
2ization was fiscal revenue, its method was political control. France
was divided into administrative units called departments and ruled
by agents of the central authority called prefets. The lines of
communication (roads, railways) followed the political chain of
command--from prefecture to Paris--with direct communication between
departments virtually banned. Until 1871, indeed, "the Departments
were forbidden by law to correspond with one another through their
General Councils and to enter into agreement to undertake any common
purpose."5
The new law of 1871 gave the departments the right to communicate
with each other--but only on "qurestions of common interest which are
not political in character" and only after prior notification to
the prefect of the departments concerned. Accordingly, the Frenchman
remained a political administre' A movement of protest against
"strangulation by centralization" promptly took shape under the
banner of regionalism. The Provenpal poet, de Berbec -Perussis, coined
the term in 1874 and it has remained in use ever since. In the next
three generations, regionalism developed into an important literary
movement and social ideology, based on the notion of a pervasive
"vegetal element" in the human life-history: healthy growth occurs
4. Pierre-Henry, Histoire des Prdfets (Paris, 1950) surveys the
system of regional administration from 1800 to 1950. A socio-
logical study of the prefectural system today is in progress under
the direction of Professor Michel Crozier of the Sorbone.
5. R. K. Gooch, M. cit., p. 117
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only when roots have been deeply planted in a native soil and the
organism is nurtured in a native climate.
The regionalists directed their wrath against the omnipotence
of Paris, which obliterated natural regional variations by imposing
administrative central standards and impoverished the regions by draw-
ing their youth to the metropolis.
In articulating their protest, the regionalists revived the
ancient ideas of regional differences as determinant of the way of
life. Maurice Baris, in Les Deracines, asserted that the cream of
young manhood of Lorraine, by following the road that led to Paris,
had been "deracinated" (cut off from their roots). This process,
repeated through all the regions of France, represented a "devital-
ization" of the "national energy." Once again the regional imagery
of the stout Normand, the dour Breton, the easygoing meridional
gained currency and credence. Marcel Pagnol's prize-winning film
Marius, which dramatized this regional imagery in 1932, is "still
one of the most popular movies in France, especially in the Midi. " 6
REGIONALISM AS SOCIAL SCIEICE
Social science developed in France during the 19th century,
as the image of regional France was being reshaped under the pressure
of centralizing government. A long tradition of social history,
enlivened with the insights of amateur social psychology, was
6. Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse (Harvard, 1957), p. 266.
4gradually remade into a more modern type of social science. A major
instrument of this change was the comparative study. No longer did the
observer focus exclusively on the particularities of a single region;
now the array of local diversities was collated and compared. A pioneer
of comparative studies was Frde'ric Le Play, who devoted much of his
life to collecting, classifying and comparing empirical data on over
300 working class families in every European and several Asian countries
Le Play wished to study the impact of industrialization upon the new
urban working class. Accordingly, he reasoned, it was necessary to
"control" all regional variations. His monumental Les Oeuvriers
Europd'n (printed in six volumes, 1855), exemplified the basic concept
and method of studying secular social problems within their natural
geographical settings.7
This new conception gave geography a commanding position at the
center of social science in France (as compared with economics in
Britain and sociology in the United States). The first great schools
of "human geography," a distinctively French discipline, were based
on the assumption that the most important context for studying people
was where they lived. Geography made its impact on each of the social
sciences. The "economic geography" associated with Henri Hauser still
persists in French scholarship today. 9 The "political geography"
7. Daniel Lerner, ed., The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences
(Meridian, 1959).
8. See the magistral four-volume work by Maximilian Sorre, a human
geographer who, within the past decade, presided over the Centre
d'Etudes Sociologiques in Paris.
9. Henri Hauser, Les Regions Economigues (Paris, 1918).
5initiated by Andr4 Siegfried earlier in this century is still the
major tradition of electoral studies in current French political
science. 1 0  While no "psychological geography" ever attained profes-
sional standing, the strong tradition of regional psychology and
gg hie sentimentale in French letters was maintained by eminent
historians and literary men. French scholars have naturally turned,
therefore, to the categories of geography in formulating their problems,
ordering their data, and interpreting their findings.
Not until recently has the authority of this position been ques-
tioned seriously among French social scientists. Indeed, the effort
to re-think the analytic categories inherited from human geography
by all the social sciences took shape only during the past decade.
In 1951, the senior French historian Fernand Braudel wrote a chal-
lenging paper entitled "Geography Faces the Social Sciences. " In
the following year, the senior sociologists of France, led by Georges
Friedmann, convoked their colleagues in neighboring disciplines for a
conference on Villes et Campagnes. As indicated by their subtitle,
"Urban Civilization. and Rural Civilization in France," the conferees
were seeking new aalytic categories for social research. In particular,
10. Andre Siegfried, Tableau Politique de la France de lOuest sous
IIRlique (Paris, 1913T
11. Fernand Braudel, "La geographie face aux sciences humaines,"
Annales (October-December 1951).
12. Georges Friedmann, ed., Villes et Campagnes (Paris, 1952).
6they were seeking to replace the "vegetal" rubrics of traditional
regionalism with the behavioral concepts of urbanism.
A profound shift of perspective was involved here. Hwan geog-
raphers had studied climate and rainfall, topography and resources,
flora and fauna as principal components of the human habitat--which
indeed they were in the agricultural France of long tradition. Con-
temporary social scientists were more concerned with class structure,
religious practice, family organization, occupational distribution,
transport and mobility--the psycho-sociological factors which have
differentiated the "milieu technique" of the city from the "milieu
naturel" of the countryside. In the philosophic sense, this shifted
attention from the natural and God-given ecological features of the
habitat, apparently fixed and immutable, to the man-made and highly
variable institutions and practices which account for social change.
These efforts yielded, in the course of the decade, a number of
striking new hypotheses about the changing conditions of French life.
Possibly the most important of these was the hypothesis that France
could be divided into two parts: France A and France B. France A
was dynamic, progressive, adaptive to change; France B was static,
traditional, routinized in its perspectives and practices. This
dichotomous conception of dynamic versus static France is attractive;
it has the elegant simplicity of all ideal types. That "urban civ-
ilization" should be radically different from "rural civilization"
in France seems natural. In America, as in all modern countries that
have lived through and studied the secular process of urbanization,
7we know that it alters individuals, reshapes institutions, and trans.
forms a nation's way of life America and Britain had undergone this
transformation by the early decades of the century, completing it in
the aftermath of World War I (when the popular song asked: "How' re
you gonna keep 'em down on the farm after they've seen Paree?").
Continental Europe--from France to Russia--has been undergoing this
process during the middle decades of the century, completing it in the
aftermath of World War 11. The rest of the world has entered into the
process of building an urban civilization and will, hopefully without
a World War III, complete it during the latter decades of this century.
The process of urbanization, therefore, has been and continues to
be crucial. How to reshape a traditional rural civilization into a
modern urban civilization is a key problem of this century. Since
this process involves the transformation of ways of life and thought
for millions of people, there is probably no question more fundamental
on the agenda of modern social science. The example of Europe is valuable
for analysis and reflection, because the continental countries have not
yet completed their process or their thinking about it. France, a
nation gifted in dramtizing its public problems, is especially inter-
esting. A key question is why the attractive typology of dynamic
France versus static France has produced regional hypotheses that are
regularly disconfirmed by the facts of contemporary French life. If
we can understand this misfit of theory and reality, we shall be in
a better position to understand the process of modernization
8The weakness of the French theory appears to be located in the
debate between regionalism and urbanism. We have indicated that
traditional French regionaaism was based on the apparently permanent
features of the natural habitat: climate and weather, topography
and soil, flora and fauna. Tne never French urbanism, on the contrary,
deals with variables produced by changing human activity: authority
and power, wealth and income, class and status, culture and personality.
A fundamental outlook on the human condition is involved in this shift
of research perspectives. Accordingly, the French effort to replace
the categories of "human geography" by those of "behavioral science"
-- and the particular French conflict between regionalism and urbanism--
presents us with a case that is singularly interesting for regional
scientists everywhere.
We believe that the French effort to preserve geography while
studying behavior breaks down because traditional regionalism has
not been effectively reconciled with modern urbanism. Even the recent
effort to delineate ideal types of urban and rural civilization does
not hold up when these ideal types are matched against the map of
France. Some rural areas have proved relatively dynamic, some urban
areas have remained relatively static. The degree of dynamism in each
region appears to be more closely associated with the behavior of its
urban centers than with fixed properties of its natural habitat. This
disparity between the God-given regions and the man-made cities is the
crux of our inquiry.
9CRAI FRAME:MOILT ANDU1ANISM
Much has changed in France during recent decades, particularly
since the end of World War II. The "natural elements" of climate,
soil, habitat wivtch did useful service during the long centuries of
the agrarian past no longer explain much. The close-mouthed Auvergnat
and the garrulous meridional are nowadays more likely to be conventional
stereotypes rather than behavioral descriptions. Climte no longer
shapes character, nor does area determine attitude, in most of France.
For the plain fact is that nowadays when one talks about the Provenpal
or Savoyard, often one is talking about people who were not even born
or raised in those regions.
Geographical mobility has entered into the lifeways of provincial
France. To an extent not even suspected until a few years ago, large
proportions of people living in any Y egion of France are likely to have
been born or raised elsewhere. The sheer magnitude of provincial
mobility was first shown in a study of Auxerre, a sma11 city south of
Paris, published in 1950. This old city, originally selected because
it was thought to be "typical" of provincial stability, turned out to
be a demographic way-station. Very few families had lived there for
more than two generations. Of its cuz rent population, two thirds had
been born elsewhere, and more than half of these came from rural com-
munes. Subsequent studies have shown that Auxerre is, indeed,
13. Charles Fettelbeim and Suzanne Frere, Auxerre en 1950 (Paris).
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"typical"--but typical of the mobility (rather than stability) which
has become a normal condition in urban France.
A simila condition of mobility in rural France is demonstrated
by studies made during the past decade. In Nouville, a small village
north of Paris in the department of Seine-Inferieur, the total popula-
tion changed very little between 1946 and 1949. However, the actual
inhabitants of this village changed by over 20' during these three
years. That is, better than 1 out c.' every 5 people living there in
1946 had moved out by 1949 and been replaced by a newcomer.14 Since
Nouville is located on the old border between Normandy and Picardy,
clearly the traditional imagery of those two regions hardly provides
reliable guidance on the behavioral characteristics of their present
inhabitants.
Recognition that traditional regionalism had outlived its use-
fulness was forced upon social scientists by Laurence Wylie's study
of a village in the Vaucluse, a region in the deep South, traditionally
assumed to be immnbile, underdeveloped, traditional in every major
respect. Wylie showed that there was a very striking mobility in
Peyrane and, moreover, that this process had been going on over a
considerable period of historical time: "In 1861, the population of
Peyrane had been farily homogeneous. There were no foreigners living
in the commune, and there were only ten people born outside the Vau-
cluse. By 1896, there were 26 foreigners and 66 people from outside
14. Lucien Bernot and Rene Blancard, Nouville: un village francais
(Paris, 1953), p. 57
1the Vaucluse living in Peyrane. Almost 10% of the population was made
up of e'rnes that .is, people coming up from other departents and
other countries. 1 5  In the decade since Professor Wylie began his
study, mobility in Peyrane has reached startling proportions. About
two out of three people living in the village in 1960 were not living
there in 1950! 16
Professor Wylie states that "the majority of the people living in
the commune were not born there. Most of them are from other towns
around Apt, and many come from still farther away--from the poorer
regions of the Alps, from Italy, and from Spain. There are Alsatian
and Belgian refugees who did not return home after the war, the Breton
wife of the farmer who once went to sea, and the Norman wife of the man
who once worked in a Rouen cotton mill. The diversified origin of this
rural population surprises us because it does not fit into our Amer-
ican stereotype of the European peasant--the naive creature riveted to
the same plot of soil which his ancestors have tilled since they stopped
living in caves. "17
The situation does not fit French stereotypes either. This order
of mobility has rendered the categories of traditional regionalism
obsolete. Small wonder that it does not explain much to account for
great political decisions in terms of "the Norman character" when over
15. Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse (Harvard, 1957), p. 20.
16. Personal Conunication
17. Wylie, M. cit., p. 14
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20% of the population of Nouville has moved between Normandy and Picardy,
or beyond both, in three years. Small wonder that it does not solve
analytic problems to speak of the "static" South, when two out of
every three inhabitants of Peyrane have changed their residence within
a single decade. After comparing his own results with those obtained
in the earlier studies we have cited, Professor Wylie concluded: "The
stereotyped differences between the northern and the southern French-
men, if they have any basis in reality, are more superficial than
funmental. '18
The foregoing should make clear why French regionalism, if it
is to give any valid account of the conditions of contemporary life,
is overdue for a fairly complete conceptual renovation. Thoughtful
social scientists in France have perceived the need and have begun to
meet it. The publication of Villes et Campagnes represented a major
effort to undermine the primacy of geography, by shifting the emphasis
from regionalism to urbanization. The important series of studies we
cited on cities and villages in provincial France have shown how to
shift the burden of social research from stability to mobility. The
newer disciplines of social psychology and regional science seem
especially well equipped to be useful. The need for a modern social
psychology is obvious. The old French regional geography linked habitat
with humor, climate with character, area with attitude--a direct one-to-one
ratio that worked only so long as Frenchmen continued to die where they
18. Ibid., p. ix.
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were born, work where they were raised, learn what they knew from
their "habitat." Now that Frenchmen are mobile, the ratio is no longer
valid, and often is seriously misleading. To understand the humor,
character, attitudes of living Frenchmen, one must study them under
conditions of mobility--of shifting environment rather than permanent
habitat.
An interesting model is provided by regional science in the
United States. As an effort to make the American social sciences
converge on problems associated with the extremely high mobility of
American life, regional science offers valuable clues to French scholars.
A recent review of work in regional science articulates several lessons,
of which three seem especially relevant to the contemporary situation
in France. First, geography has been reduced to its proper propor-
tion in the array of social sciences. Among the Papers and Proceedings
of the Regional Science Association, geography occupies about the same
order of magnitude as sociology and political science. The contrast
with traditional French regionalism is even more marked when one dis-
cerns that "geography" in this context does not confine itself to
permanent features of the habitat, but studies the shifting spatial
environment of mobile human beings. Second, a very considerable amount
of attention is devoted to topics grouped as "planning." Every reader
of Karl Mannheim's brilliant essay on "Thought at the Level of Planning"
ill appreciate how profoundly the planning perspective must alter
the study of mobility in any society. Third, and possibly most important,
the bulk of professional work in regional science is concerned with
14
economic problems--these constituting nearly two-thirds of the output
of American regional scientists in the first five years of their pro-
fessional publication. 1 9
The primacy of economic factors in social mobility is fairly
evident. People move because they can no longer get what they want
where they are, or because they believe they can get more of what
they want elsewhere. What people want, usually, is more of the material
goods of life. Accordingly, economic analysis takes priority in
accounting for the facts of mobility. Since mobility, however stim-
ulated, also involves a total change of environment for the people who
move, all the social sciences finally are needed in the effort to
comprehend their changing lifeways. American regional science has
made an impressive effort to deal analytically with the behavioral
manifold of mobility. It seeks to integrate, so to speak, the social
psychology of the economic use of space and resources to produce an
acceptable code of rational behavior fo mobile persons. Such an
effort requires new indices of behavior that produce valid knowledge
about the new lifeways of mobility.
The next section of this study reports some exploratory efforts
to locate such indices in contemporary France. The purpose was to
determine whether further systematic work in this direction would
be fruitful. Our ultimate concern is to establish indices that would
19. Lloyd Rodwin, "Regional Science: Quo Vadis?", in Papers and
Proceeding of the Regional Science Association, vol. V (1959),
p=p.t 15-2b.
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bring the full array of conceptual resources in regional science to
bear on the critical problem of understanding what distinuises
"dynamic" fram "static" France--and why. This involves nothing less
than understanding what mobility and urbaniam-the lifeways of modern-
ity--are doing to contemporary French society.
URBANIS3M AMD MODEMlf7ATION
If the categories of analysis for social science are to include
the concepts used by the regional analysts, they must be specified in
terims which have operational significance. If, for exruple, we are
to characterize a region by its "easygoing" laziness inspired by the
hot sunshine, we must as a first step prove that there are in fact
more sunny days and that its mean temperature is higher than other
regions with which it is being compared. Having proved the initial
X, we must then prove the terminal Y: i.e., that the inhabitants are,
in fact, lazier. This may be indexed by some mieasure of their output
work. If the French regionalists are right, areas where the sun is
most Intense should be the areas where the people are not. In fact,
howover, the mean temperature and bumnan dynamism in French regions
are nat associated in the way the regional characterizations would
have it The vrarm South, for examle, is one of the most dyranic
regions in France toayr It Is our finding that regions can be more
clearly defined by operational Indices if we do not use nature as
the prime force, but human activity as maniested In the building
of an Urhfan civilization.
It has already been suggested that conventional French defitnitions
of regions have been considerably outmoded by the mobility of populat4ion
within ard between regions. This is not to deny that there are regions
in France. It is rather to suggest that regious now are more clearly
differentiated by the modern characteristics of mobilty and urbanism,
which index the life-style of human behavior, rather than the vegeta-
tional indices previously postulated. If we are to keep the notion
of regions, it is now more appropriate to define them by the elements
which characterize the life-style of a man who spends his tume there.
The domirant element of French regions today is the presence (or
absence) of a major city whic hi spreads its economic vadues and other
behavioral patterns throughout its hinterland area, We have studled,
a number of indices which characterize and measure the degree of
modernization in French regions today- These indices C" the modern
life-style have been measured and compared In the differ ent depart-
ments of France. On all of these indices, there is a close match of
modern vays with the level of urbanization existing in each depart-
ment. These matching patterns spread into the hinterland and form
the new basis to characterize regions,
Ile have taken the measure of such important factors as the amowt
of electricity used--an index of the supplanting of muscle-power by
electro-motive force, We have exasained the distribution of radio,
television, and cinema ca-pacity.-an index of the modern req1uirement.
for continuous contact with the "social enviromment" typically supplied
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by the mass medli. We have taken such measures of comfort as new
housing and health facilities, and such measures of skill as university
and lycee attendance. We have also measured the degree to which prox-
imity to urban regions is related to the agricultural productivity of
farming areas.
We have taken these indices as a way of masuring the existence
of processes- -mainly urbanien and mobility--that deeply affect the way
people spend their time, apply their energy, and shape their thoughts
and feelings. Such processes are significant determinants of the life-
style of individuals. In order to establish the degree of association
between urbanization and other indices of modernization, we defined
urbanization as a simple sta-istical proportion of population living Hi
communities of 2,000 and larger. We divided the 90 departments of
France at the midpoint of this neasure, the top 45 having the nigher
percentage of population living in urban comunities, and the bottom
45 11vire, in less urbanized areas.
This simple cutting point was selected after we had tried several
other methods.; We found that when we refined the masure by four or
more cutting points, the relationship of our other indices of modern-
ization with urbanization ranained fairly constant. In general, the
relationship is direct and monotonic . While some exceptions to this
rule vere founzd by establishing several cutting points, as shown in
the tables that follow, the exceptions did not change the nmajor import
of our results. Since the use of several cutting points only increased
the com-p.lexity of presentation without adding value to the data, we
report, only those cases where significant variation occurred. Ir all
other cases, the reader can assisne that the resltsl remain sbstan-
tially the same, even when we take four or wore cutting points,.
The tables below present the data on which we base #*he conclusion
that fundamental aspects of maodernization (or "dynamism:') in France
today are associated more closely with uxbanization than with any
possible combination of Qatural regions conventionally used. by French
regional analysts. Mst of our tables present data for the years
1954 and 192. These indicate that the relationships we are reporting
have remined stable over the critAcal postwar period and continue
rrto the present as a major factor in French development. However,
it vi .11b 1e noted that wtenever we preient data for two years, the
moroe rccent year shcve a lesaer degree of a4sciation than the earlier
year.
This suggests that even the pattern here presented as the best
way of accouinting for recent French deve1opment is itself in the
process of change, This finding, which is documented in detail in
Part TI,, idicates that close and continuing study of modernization
in France is likeIy to provide findilngs of c-tmlative importance to the
field of arban and regional science.
Our exploration started from the finding that regional hypotheses
based. on geography had failed to acco.urnt for the defeat of iOC-a
rm~~jor pol.iia ~ decis vioni whi chi had, a both sides claimed, deepy
involved the vo2le French nation, W ettributed tis failure of
anaOlyAs to the In adequacy of reiornal geography a a
system in contemporary Francec2 Poi tical behavior and social attitudes
no longer correspond to regional boundaries; becaie very many French
adults today no longer Alive where they were born If they still ex-
hibit attitudes characteristic of their natal region, they do so
elsewhere in France, Many of them, doubtless, have res3haped their
natal attitudes in aysP more suitable to the place vhere they are
living-i. , ,getting thetr education, earrng their livelihood,
courting their mates, rasing their families.
Regional geography failed for reasons which led som e scholars
to bcJieve that urban-rtural soci ology might succeed as ela-
tory system. We have seen that a group of eminent French social
scientists followed this 2ead in the imoortant conference on "Viiles
eLtCargpgne in 1950 They proposed a new set of categories to account
for the changing, shape of French society- -i e, "urban civilization"
and "rural civilization. " While the difference between city nd.
country "types" has long been clear, tIece categories had not been
wade the basis for systematic zocial earch in France.
By the time these types ere rooed, however, new sties iwre
shoing that they had to be severely ,ualified Postwar mobility
in France was proving to be varied in form anAd xesive in scope,
The nortLern village of Nouvill],e damonstrated te riagnitude of inter-
regional. mobility. The more central cit y cf Auxerre showei the eixteint
20, Daniel Lerner and' Raymod Aron, ed m, nce Defeats EC (New
Yok,; 1957),,
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of intra-regional inter-urban mobility. Wylie's Peyrane, in the
south, exhibited all forms of mobility--international, inter-regional,
inter--local. Of special interest vas the two-way flow of movement
between Peyrane and mrseille. The move to the city, hich urbanized
all modern countries over the past two centuries, appeared to be
counter-balanced by movement to the village. Under these circun-
stances, Vhen vany Frenchmen are incorporating both rural and urban
experience within their own life history, too dichotomous a polariza-
tion of "uban civilization" against "rural civilization" is likely
to be misleading. The new mobility, unlike the simple urbanization
of preceding centuries, involves a complex and continuous process of
inter-ccmunication that reshapes both town and village in a common
pattern.
The movement of persons, supplemented by the movenent of images
through mass media, brings urban and rural "types" into incessant
contact. Out of the frictions generated by contact and the adapta-
tions reqi red by coexistence, a homogenizing process developed that
tends to reduce and perhaps finally obliterate urban-rural differen-
ces. This process culminates in the emergence of an "urban region"
such as the Northeast Atlantic coastline of the United States, where,
from Boston to alchmond, the mjority of inhabitants are in direct
daily contact with "urban civilization." Whereas France in 1960 is
much less urbanized than the United States, Paris is already the
center of an "urban region" that radiates west to Rouen, north to
Lille, east to Nancy, south to Dijon. This brings about a fourth
23.
of French territory and a third of French population within the orbit
Of1 urban lifevaYsc Less extensive, but quite shapely, 'urban regions"
appear to be forming around Marseille end Lyon, the next largest cities6
after Paris.
The urban region appears to be the major direction that Frencb
modernization wi13 take in the future, Accordingly, it is here that
"e souht u clue to the d:if erences between static" and. "dyamic"
Frauce. We hypothesized that rural areas centered upon a "dnamic
city would be more "modern" than other rural areas--regaress of
reion, clinate, soil and othaer natur1 geographtcal conditions
Accordingly, our Tables were constructed to determine the degree of
association between urbanism and other Indices of Ifdernzation. If
the correspondence were perfect, high and low urbanism would cc incide
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Lvyae Students University Stuients
among the population among the population
aged 11-17 aged 17-24
1959 1960
69 31 67 33
Urbanism Urbanism 6
1962 196e
31 69 33 67
More data could be added. to illustrate that communications of
all kinds focus around the urban areas. Such an exercise would only
illustrate more emphatically that the important dimension of com-
munications is well accounted for by urbanism and there is no need
to apply historic notions of geography or natural characteristics
to account for this salient feature of modernity. The exposure to
new ideas, new places, and new modes of thought which are found in
the mass media and over the span of the educational experience are
directly associated with urban areas.
23. For lycee students, 1959, see Informations Statistiques (du Minis-
tere de 1'Blucation, Nationale), Rapport entre les effectifs schol-
arises dans les etablissemnts du niveau du second degre' et Ia
population de 11 a 17 ans, par departement, 1959--1960, 39, April
1962,sp 153-173.
For university students, 1960, see Informations Statistiques (dui
Ministere de 1'iducation Nationale), "Origine Geographique des
Etudiants des Universit 4 Frangaises au 30 Juin 1960,;" 42, July
1962, pp. 284-285.
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Many other aspects of modernity were indexed and they too asso-
ciated with urbanism. The comforts of good health, protection, and
shelter are exanmlea. The top half of the French departments included
76% of the doctors and 73A of the dentists (per capita, 1961). New
housing construction followed the urban path as well: 80% of new
housing was built in the more urban half of the French departments
(per capita, 1959).
Eamples of dynamism and the advantages of modernity could be
multiplied, to illustrate that a modern civilization is an urban
civilization, but we have already d1splayed an adequate array of
indices on this point. However, there is one more set of figures with
special interest. The urban civilization, which accelerates and
develops the industrial aspects of modernity, also spills over into the
rural areas to hasten development there as veil. Table 4 records the
result that agricultrual productivity and urbanism are related positively:
Table 24
Agricultural Productivity






24. A reliable and valid measure of agricultrual productivity is difficult
to construct for purposes of comparison. For the results presented
here, we rely on: L No S.EE, Annudre Statistiue de la France,
Etudes et Conjonctures, special number (1955), agricultural pro-
ductivity, 18-19, 34-87.
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Data of this kind, multiplied many times, indicate that traditional
regional characteristics no longer account for the relevant changes of
modern life. Even in the behavior patterns indexed by agricultural
productivity, output is less related to the traditional temperament of
a region (e.g., its "laziness") than to its proximity to an urban center.
The development of agriculture provides a good example of the
spreading dynamism of a city. We know that agricultural productivity
rose sharply in France during the decade 1950-1960 and we associate
this with the great increase of farm equipment: tractors quadrupled,
harvesters multiplied sixfold, milking machines doubled. Wylie's
Peyrane also shows how closely associated agricultural productivity
is with urbanism, energy consumption and mass media. The peasant
Carrette, even though he is regarded as a "primitive" by the other
Peyranais, acquired a tractor in the past decade. He doesn't much
like the machine, but was driven to it by the shortage of agricultural
labor that has accompanied urbanization in the Vaucluse. The histor-
ical sequence whereby rising urbanism brings rising agricultural
productivity illy-nilly--i.e., without respect to geography, culture,
personality--is thus nicely illustrated in the life-history of Car-
rette. It explains why the Peyrane tractor cooperative, which in 1950
had one tractor and one full-time employee, in 1959 had three of
each. By 1961, there were 225 members, a new garage, and a substantial
array of farm machinery. It also explains why Carrette---although he
still prefers to cultivate behind his horse rather than atop his trac-
tor-is delighted that the higher-voltage electricity used for running
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machinery is being installed in the region. Thus, rising urbanism and
agricultural producttvity historically entrain increasing energy con-
sumption,
The interaction of mass media with this modernization matrix Is
also vividly illustrated in Peyrane. Carrette does not own a tele-
vision set, but he is rapidly getting to be the exception rather than
the rule--an instance of why the neighbors regard him as sauvage.
Television brought Peyrane into the urban media network suddenly and
rapidly when a transmitter was erected in the Luberon Mountain two
years ago, to relay the Marseille programs to the Vaucluse, Already,
two years later, there are thirty receivers in the village--and most
of these were bought on the installment plan! Wylie gives a dramatic
account of the transformations wrought by these receivers in the
traditional lifeways of Peyrane--its cafe society and boules tourn-
aments, social conversation and personal mobility. Wylie character-
ized the moderrdzing process in this way:
"Now that Emile Pian has adopted a different
attitude toward installment buying he has satisfied
another longstanding desire. He still does not feel
rich enough to buy a car, but he has bought a
scozter, and his wife and he travel about the
Cpartment whenever he has a day off, In 1950, we
took the Plans to cal. on his motLer and sister
who live In a farm in the next village; they had
not seen each other in months, Nov Emile and his
wife drive over to see them frequently, Emaile likes
to swoim, but there is no place to svim in Peyrane.
He now drives, once a week, to the neighboring
village of Saint-SaturnI:i, 5i miles away, where the
government haa built a new public svimming-pool.
Before he got his scooter Dmile had clmbed MFont
Ventoux only once. In the last year, he and Made-
leine have made the trip twice e The Pians and
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their neighbors have broadened and pushed back their
horizons considerably in the last few years 0 "25
Wylie 's Peyrane thus exemplifies the regularities exhibited
statistically by our data and suggests an explanation for the devia-
tions. The central tendency of these deviations in the less urbanized
departments was to increase their productivity, energy consumption
and media exposure more rapidly than their population. This suggests
that many places in provincial France are rapidly incorporating urban
lifeways without becoming cities--or even increasing their own size
significantly. Peyrane, for example, shows no substantial population
increase in the decade since 1950. But its mobility rate is stag-
gering-- -two-thirds of its population changed over this same decade.
The key seems to be that Peyrane, along with the entire department of
Vaucluse, has been incorporated within the orbit of Marseille. It is
thus able to modernize rapidly without growing larger. The stimuli
and facilities of moderization are diffused throughout the urban
region centered upon the dynamaic city of Marseille.
Furthermore, these same urban departments are now attracting and
creating the largest share of the population increase in postwar
France. Of the 45 departments raked highest in population growth
from 19146 to 1962, 36 were also ranked in the highest 45 departments
for urbanism. Only 9 of the lowest 45 departments in population growth
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were in highly urban areas
25. Laurence Wylie, unpublished manuscripts, p. 9.
26. L SE . E , Population Legale; cf - n 21.
A similar picture obtains for smanler time periods within the
long period. Thus, the most urban departments have shown the highest
inerease of population and the least urban departments bave shown
the least increase of population,
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that "dynamic
France" corresponds, not to the traditional natural regions, but to
the new urban regions. That population increase is now so decisively
superior in the most urban departments, while the majority of least
urban departments show the least increase, is a highly suggestive
finding. Traditionally, it was supposed, city people barely reproduced
themselves and recruited their ever-increasing cohorts from the highly
reproductive villages. This appears to be changing. The data on
population increase show that the most urban departments are consistently
outgrowing the least urban departments. This is probably too great a
difference to be accounted for even by the extraordinary increase of
rural-urban mobility in France tcday. For a striking feature of this
mobility, as shown in Nouville and Auxerre and Peyrane, is that it
involves a tvo-way traffic whereby the village's loss to the city
tends to be compensated.
We suspect that French reproductive patterns may be changing--
but this is another problem to be investigated on another occasion,
For our present purposes, it is sufficient to kn'w that the most
urban departments are increasing their population most rapidly by
far, A multiplier effect comes into play at this point, since a place
where there are more people will increasingly outnumber, if it maintains
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an equal rate of increase, a place that has fewer people to start with.
Accordingly, even without any assumption about urban versus rural
reproductivity, we can understand why the largest cities in France
today are growing the most rapidly. Tat the rate of increase in
French cities now actually surpasses the rate of increase in zural
places is suggested by the statistics for 1957. In the column
showing excess of births over deaths among inbabitants for the year
the highest rates were registered by the largest cities. Only four
places showed an excess of 3,000 or more births over deaths, and
these are the centers of the four principal urban regions that have
taken shape in recent years--Paris, Lille, Lyon, Marseille. The
next three highest rates (between 2-3,000) were registered by Rouen,
Le Havre, and Nantes--urban centers which form the principal links
of the Paris region with Normandy and Brittany respectively. The
next bighest rates (over 1,000) were registered by 19 places--all
of them important secondary cities in one of the great urban regions.*
THE SPBFADIG UMBA R MIONS
As the large urban center grows ever more populous, it spreads
steadily across its own borders into the rural areas. Villages become
suburbs. The suburbs expand, interconnect, and finally form a contin-
uous link between the dynamic urban centers of formerly separate areas.
* As the question of urban-rural fecundity is collateral to the cen-
tral interest of this paper, we included this brief statement only
to indicate a problem on which further research is needed.
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This produces the urban region. As will be shown on the map of
France, the modern areas are mainly in departments which ring the
great cities, The urban region of Lyon now encloses Savoie, Haute
Savoie, Isare, Jura, Ain, Loire, Allier, and Puy du D e. The urban
region centered on Marseille now brings Var, Basses Alpes, hautes
Alpes, DrAne, Vaucluse and Gard into the ranks of dynamic departments.
The spreading urban region transforms the daily round of life for
those within its orbit. Innovation and change become the rule. The
traditional routines of rural existence give way illy-nilly, as we
saw in the life of Carrette, to the new urban demands and rewards.
The city's presence is pervasive. Consider the paradoxical situation
sketched by Wylie: "At present, the number of mushrooms raised in
Peyrane is directly proportionate to the number of horses in the stalls
of the race tracks and cavalry barracks of Marseille, for these are
the only large commercial sources of manure in the region. 2 7  That
a rural village must now depend upon city horses for manure may be
the last strav!
To show the comprehensive character of the changes wrought
within urban regions in graphic form, we prepared a map. Each
department's total score was computed by adding its scores on each
of nine indices, one representative from each type of index presented
in the previous tables. The higher the score, the more dynamic is the
department. We then classified & l represe..nt&1 the doatet cording
to three grou high (white), medium (dotted), and low (shaded) dynazsmn
27. Wylie, pg. eitu, p. 25-
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When these results are arranged on the j.cecedir map of France,
a startling picture emerges. As in Caesar's time, omnia Gallia in
tres partes divisa est. The three-dimensional structure supplies
a useful corrective for the current hypotheses about the regional
shape of French modernIzation. These hypotheses, as we saw earlier,
are all dichotomous: dynamic North versus static South; dynamic
Perimeter versus static Center; dynamic Northeast versus static
Southwest. Although the growth of the South has reversed the North-
South dichotomy, these hypotheses reflect some aspects of the real
picture. There are more dynamic departments on the Perimeter than
in the Center, more In the Northeast than in the Southwest., Indeed,
Andre-Philip 's notorious line from Rouen to Marseille turns out, as
the map shovs, to provide the boundary between Northeast and Southwest
which most efficiently separates dynamic from static departments on a
regional basis.
Yet, each of these dichotomies fails to reflect the critical
aspect of French modernization revealed by the dotted departments--
those which are no longer static and are not yet dynamic. If we
draw another line from Rouen to Geneva, thereby dividing France into
three parts, we get a more efficient differentiation of white, dotted,
and lined zones. But too many departments are not accounted for even
by this trichotomous regional plan. The reason, we submit, is that
French modernization is following no plan based on natural regions.
Its course is better traced through the development of urban regions
which can grow, regardless of geography, wherever there is a dynmic
urban center.
This can be demonstrated by loodng at the deviant departments of
the map. In the dark zone, there is the dotted department of Loire-
Infdrieure based on the flourishing city of Nantes. On the Atlantic
coast, there is a cluster of dotted departments centered on Bordeaux
(Gironde). Another dotted cluster, along the Spanish border, is cen-
tered on Toulouse (Haute-Garonne). That these clusters are still
dotted may be explained by the low growth of Bordeaux and Toulouse,
relative to other cities of their size, during the period 1946-954.
As the growth of these urban centers accelerates, w believe, their
surrounding clusters will turn white.
This process is illustrated by the deviant white clusters within
another dark zone. The central dcepartment of Bhone is based upon
Lyon, third largest city of France. The larger cluster on the Mediter-
ranean comprising Gard, Vaucluse, Bouches du Rhone, and spread through-
out the South, is centered upon 4arseille, second largest city after
Paris. The Marseille cluster is of special interest because it
deviates consistently from the current hypothesis. It is in the static
South. Most of it lies southwest of the Rouen-Marseille line. Only
one of its departments is on the Perimeter, the other tvo being in-
teror. Yet, we find here the largest white cluster in all of Fra"nce,
even larger than t supposedly most dynamic area of the Northeast.
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We have already shown, in statistical terms, the process whereby
Marseille produced this dynamic urban region centered upon itself.
Laurence Wylie's happy decision to study the Vaucluse gives us a rare
and comrehensive port:ait of how the process works itself out in the
daily liveIs of real people. That a true urban region is growing on the
Mediterranean coast--i.e., the natal region of the stereotyped me-rid-
ionale with his garrulous, indigent, uncihanging "character"--is news
worth noting by all conxcerned with the conditions of moernization in
contemporary society,
Our conclusion is that this is no freakish occurrence due to the
"accidental" presence of the geat seaport city of Marseille. On the
contrar, we believre that the urban region is the basic pattern of
French modernization. The validity of this expectation is heightened
by quotation from work done five years ago based on 1954 data. In
1959, we drew a rap sirixlar to the one show.n in this paper. At that
time there were deviat cases in the South, especially the Alpes
Maritimes, and in the Rhone region around Lyon. These deviant cases
have by rw followed our expentation as a comparison of the quotation
and the contemporary map illustrate.
"IV current (1954) data are extrapolated, the process already
at work will accelerate In scope and tempo so that, by the end of this
decade, two changesa will have appeared on the ricdernization map of
France: (1) the entire Mediterranean will have becom a huge modern
urban region; (2) this Mediterranean regi on vill have established
regular intercouirse with a lare cerntral urban region centered upon
Lyon. "
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"Consider the data on which this expectation is based. Notice
the dark department of Alpes Mariti'mes This last deviant region is
centered upon Nice, the most rapidly-growing city in France (15-7%
increase between 1946-1954 as compared with 11.2% for the second-
place city of Nantes). By 1954, Nice was already the sixth largest
city in France. By 1970, at present rates of growth, it will be third
(after Marseille) or fourth (after Lyon). Either way, Nice is creating
an urban region at the Eastern end of the Mediterranean that can hardly
avoid merging into the urban region already centered on Marseille.
Required for this is the urbanization of the two departments of Var
and Basses Alpes."
"Note further that the city of Lyon (Rhone) is ringed about by
departments showing the highest rates of urbanization in 1946-54.
Here, too, the urban region is spreading rapidly. Contets between
the Lyon and the Mediterranean regions pass through the departments
of Isere and Drome. Both of these are in the highest rank of urban-
ization as well. Indeed, if we follow the lead suggested and recast
the map of France according to levels of urbanization in 1954, a quite
different picture already emerges with several surprising elements.
"We note, first, that the Rhone-editerranean region is A
more consistently white than the region northeast of Paris. It con-
tains fewer departments with a high proportion of people living in
places smailer than 2,000 population. The only important exception,
in fact, is Basses Alpes. While this department had not yet achieved
the highest level of urbanism by 1954, its rate of urbanization
indicates that it will do so in due course. "
"We notice, further, a new string of white departments including
Herault, Tarn, Haute Garonne. This is the line of cnumrmication
between Mrseille and Toulouse, fourth largest city of France in 1954,
With the eastern and western departments of the Pyrenees also waite,
a new urban region may be in the makUng here. As the formation of
a true Pyrenees urban region would depend heavily upon the dynamism of
Toulouse, which, unlike Maxseille and Wice, had been growing relatively,
slowly, this is a more problematica.l development. It does present a
possible direction of future modern ization that must surely startle
any Frenchman who clings to the familiar stereotypes of the Old
Southwest. "
Each one of these anticipations from 1954 data had been realized
by the end of the decade. The urban regions have spread and. inter-
locked, creating large dynamic areas that form a new basis for
regionalism in France.
TOWAM~ A REGIONAL~ SCIENCE IN FRAUE
We conclude this section of our study by raising more questions
than wie thought yere waiting to be aske d-mre questions, certainly,
than we have the means to answer. While the questions that seem
important to lu are substantive and concrete, their common tendency
is to Cast doubt upon the current conventions and categories of
analysis from which students of France have tended to draw their
answers-whben these conventions have not, indeed, inhibited the
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asking of relevant questions at all. Postwar France has been under-
going a basic transformation. Bev perspectives, indeed new assumptions,
are needed to deal with the process adequately. Nor is this the first
time in French history that an inherited stereotype persisted long
after it had outlived its explanatory value., until scholars began to
look at the facts without the stereotypical blinders. A good example
is J. J. Spengler's succinct subversion of a superannuated supposition
about French economic behavior: "Despite France's reputation as a.
nation of savers, net saving was less in France than in Britain or
Germany throughout most of the period 1360-1930. "28
By connecting economic with demographic retardation, Spengler
was able to show that psychological, cualtural and political. factors
had all been Interwoven into a mrix of social stagnation 29 Mis
sent beyond the concntionalized coiplaints about the loss of Lan vital
which perviaded social analysis in prewar France, It showed vhy and how
postwar Franen must make a successful major drive toward modernization
or resign itself to a minor place in the European as well as the
world scene 30
Such a postwar drive is ir progress. Already, France bas made
some notable advances in miodernization and the process is continuing.
281 J. J. Spengler, "France's Declining Bate of Demographic Grth,
in Demographic Analris (Free Press, 1956), pe. 5910
29. ibid , pp. 594-5.
30 The basic studies leeding to this conclusion were made by Alfred
Sauvy and, under his direction, by the Institut Naional d'Etudes
D~mographiques .
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This is an exciting sequence to study systematically. From it we can
learn much about the actual position and future prospects of France,
From it we can also learn much about the general process of social
growth, and about the particular form it takes when a relatively modern
nation seeks to make a "big push" forward.
We cannot observe this process fruitfully, however, if we are
blinded by stereotypes. We can only fail to observe it if we work with
the conventional clichgs of French regionalism. Tne notion that the
South must be static because of meridional climate and character can
only prevent us from seeing that one of the most dynamic regions in
France today is, in fact, growing in the South. Inter-regional mobil-
ity has made these traditional categories of explanation obsolescent,.
Nor do we gain much light from the more recent categories juxtaposing
urban and rural "civilizations" in dichotomous feahion. Part II vill
explore this in still more detail. There was once a day when import-
ant differences among Frenchmen could be explained in terms of rural
versus urban habitat. This was the -rance of Balzac. Even earlier in
this century, a novel like Le Notaire du Havre could portray a way of
life peculiar to the provincial city in France and Marcel Aym4 could.
depict the unique features of isolated village life in La Jument Verte.
The clarity and charm of these portraits is not lessened by the recog-
nition that Le Havre and Hendaye are no longer what they were,. Failure
to recognize this, indeed, can only obscure our vision of what they
have becomeco
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Needed today are categories of analysis focused upon the changes
that are actually reshaping French reality today. How mny people are
moving? From were to were? working at vhat? earning how much?
producing how mueh of what? consuming how much of what? In so doing,
how are they changing their style of life--the ways they raise their
children? the ways they spend their leisure? the ways they judge
themselves and the world around them?
Mobility is the key. People acquire a sense of the new through
contact with the new--hether it comes to them via the mass media
or they go to it on a used scooter. Through such contacts people
acquire new desires--to live in a different place, to work at a
different job, to get a better education, to have more of the good
things of life. Such desires evoJke new ways and new uses of old
ways--to own and use a tractor, to visit Marseille on a Sunday pran-
enade instead of a walk in the Peyrane woods, to watch a televised
swimming meet from Paris instead of a boules tournament at the local
caf$, to follow another trade than farming, to perceive one's wife
otherwise than as a valuable piece of family property.
The mjor direction of mobility in France today is the formation
of urban regions and their spread into rural areas. Here is where the
line between static and dynamic France is being daily drawn--and redrawn.
The discussion in Part II will show that the spread of urban lifeways
is proceeding even to the point where the urban-rural dichotomy may
eventually be lost. Through this process, the old natural regions
are merging into one another. The cities and the Tillages, once en-
compassed in an urban region, are interpenetrating each other and
nrging their interests as well as their attitudes. It is this pro-
cess which can focus the converging researches now underway in a
true regional science that will serve the future needs of French
public policy.
PAR'I I
From Regione.L Diversity to Matiorui Polity
The Trend Toviard Homoenization
Meithodlogic&Tt Append.ix
PAR 11
FRCN REDIONAL DIVEITM TO NATIOKL POLIT
In post-ar France the pace of ch&ge has accelerated vith little
regard to historic regioas or traditional patterns In Part I. the spread
of urban regione was exmilned and the traditional notion of "static" vs.
"dynamic" France was seen to be little more than an anachronistic stereo-
type. If regional analysir was to be of any value, it had to base itself
on urban rather than natural regions, The urban region has existed because
the process of industrialization did sem to favor already developed and
urban regions over the "static" areas As a result, there have been wide
differences in the standard of living and lifestyles among the regions. By
the 1950's,, however, this process of diverging regional standards of living
had been arrested and prcbably reversed On a material acale, there is a
slow but definite homogenization., of regional standards of living, an assim-
ilation of regiona. economies into a national economay, and, as we suggest
in Part 11, an erosion of regional politics by forces which are national
in their scope.
In Part II, the concern is to demonstrate the extent to which the
homogenization process is altering the behavior of Frenchmen. The new
lifestyle is typified by what is happening to one of the traditional
groups of French trademen, the bakers. A baker, whose occupatIon
would traditionally classijy him as a French "petit, " has increased
his trade by not only selling at the smali store attached to the bakery
itself, but also by distributioa through a number of smnall grocery
stores and by direct delivery to farmhouses, Ri ntreprenerial re-
turns are spent reguarly on wekend by racig a 'ercedes from his hoe
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in Mondragon 4a village north of A-vignon or tbe Paris-MarseIne highway;
to Geneva and back. Most bakers are rei'ther as successful nor as f amboyant
as this one, but they are a U in so-me way modern. Their modernity, like
the Wandertust of the Mondrcaton baker, was disclosed by a sample survey of
U5 bakers in the Vaucluse, a department in southeastern France. Oily
two of these bakers still baked with the traditional wood fire. One was
thinking of changIng to a factory job. The other charged relatively hi gh
prices for specialty products sold. to toisixts and, the local wealthy. One baker
who sold only in the small town of Chateauneaf-d.u-Pape,. has already turned
to deep freezing techniques. He nowz has much more leisure than most cher
bakers,
Regional. inequalities in communications are also leveling out,
With the TV set, the pin all machine, arid the jukebox, the cafe in French
villagesq partakes of the eame world as any Joe 's Bar. There are more of our
Vauclusian bakers who have radios and don't listen to them than there are bakers
who are nomr Some radio non-listeneres are already TV viewers, other'
complain about the poor qguAty of government broadcasting after midnight
vhen work begins for most bakers)I Those fey who simpy will not listen,
who lack the empathy neceary to intereet. mst buy a radio in response
to some combinaticn of status consideraticns and. childrens' demands.
n1rctcay a the bakers have been to Parie at least Qoce.. usually
n -he course f m1iary servtce. A. more st riking ftinira
almos1, zne-al f have had resecrxa to make a secoud trip. Teen-agers are
now taken to a on scbool Vripe. A majcr part of th- new"' they brting. back
L The survey ill be reported in detai An the author's forthcomi.ng
Ph. D diseer'tation at Itbe Massacbusetts nstitute of Techno'logy.
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to the village concerns the self-service cafeteria. For them, contact
vith cities reinforces interest In modern economics and. cultural products
Attention is maintained in the small tcwn or village by a heavy flcw of
mass a This situation, coupled with steadily rising cash ncomes,
seems to have been instrmental in accelerating consumer demands in areas
of slight urbanization. This acceleration is proceeding rapidly enough
to produce hoimogenization.
fow far moderization of provincial towns and villages has gone and
is likely to go is shown by how the bakers feel about. creating and
rearing chldren- One of the survey questions they found easiest to
answvjer concerned the possible introduction of female contraceptives, currently
illegal in France. About 90 per cent favored contraception and alIost all
elaborated why. While many( responses dealt simply with the avoidance of
children or the reduction of povertGy, the modal response focueed on an increase
in choice and. pleasure. Sti. others constdered the problem of contracepticn
In termrs of its beneficial effects on women, perhaps indicating a general
increase in respect for women.
There was a siilar consensus that chi.dren should not be subject to
corporl punishment and that the influence of the mass media, the motorbike,
and les cogetns woul d not be overly dangerous. Direct obserovation sugests
that corporal. punishment is in fact decreasing and that parents in the
Vancluse have al-loied. their Children to accelerate their contacts wi.-h
mdernity. -2n 1'99 one rarely saw -een-age griri dressed in hel and
stockiigs, By 1962 the exception had become the rule.
Note that the Vaucluse is one of the least Cetholic departments o
France
The people of the regions of Prance are rapidly moving into the Western
cultural orbit. Provincial parents and Parisian parents still look rather
different in dress, but provincial teenagers and Parisianteenagers are much
more similar. As young adults, nearly all of the bakers' sons will no
longer live in their fathers' towns or work at their fathers' trade. Only
10 per cent of the current bakers had lived in the same town since birth.
Farming was the modal occupational category for their fathers. Only two of
315 bakers want their sons to be bakers. More typical is the fellow pulling
strings with relatives to get his son "in" at Pierrelatte, the plant where France
ill make uranium for the force de frappe. Mobility of this kind has been a
key element in the weakening of regional identities.
Politically, de Gaulle's personal predominance makes it rather difficult
to speculate on the long-run effects of the process of regional chane.
Certainly the de Gaulle of the sixties is a very different political anl
from the de Gaulle of the postwar R.P.F. The devoted Gaullist militant is
much less in presence. Instead de Gaulie has become the outstanding French
television personality, a position he has reinforced by Government monopolization
and control of television and radio news. De Gaulle complements his TV appearances
with tours of the provinces, a technique used successfully since the war by only
one other politician, Pierre Poujade. By thus developing a national couummications
strategy, de Gaulle has built the most national (in terms of geographic dispersion
of voting strength non-Comunist political organization.
De Gaulle's success on a national basis seems to herald a possible major
consequence of the reduction of French regional differences, the elimination of
basically regional parties as important factors in the political system. A party
like the MRP, based largely on local conaunications system in Brittany and
Lorraine, or like the Independents, concentrated in rural areas, Vould seem
on the wane as parties and populations part of a national cnmminations
system move into the old "safe" areas. Time might then look favorably upon
the development of a new national party out of the present Socialists, the
most nearly national of the non-Cnemint and non-Gaullist alternatives.
Already Gaston Deferre, de Gaulle's annowuced opponent, must defend himelf
against running a "eampagnel l'am'ricaine., 3
The process of regional homogenization can be documented quantitatively
by analyzing the trend in the departmental concentration of various socio-
economic indices. We will do this and thereby arrive at some interesting
camparisons of the relative progress of homogenization in different sectors
(income, transportation, mass media) Having explored the homogenization
process, we ill relate it to
(1) the observation that urbanization rate is no longer related
to modernization rates.
(2) the shift of urbanisation away from the northeast to new
urban regions In the southeast and southwest of France.
TE TREND TO HCEE1ZATION
For a single variable, we can judge the extent of homogenization by
measuring the "concentration" of that variable among the departments.
If one of the 90 departments of France contained the entire pcpultion
of France, we would say that there tas perfect coneentration of population.
3. LeMonde, February 8, 1964, p 6.
At the other extrme, if all departnts bad equal populations we Vould say
that a state of ocplete equality or complete homogenization prevailed,
Econcmsts have conventionally indexed the degree of concentration by
the Lorenz measure, vhieh assigns a value of I to perfect concentration,
a value of 0 to cotrolete homogenization, and intermediate values to the
typical cases of partial. concentration, We have been able to estimte the
Lorenz measure for a number of variables. By charting the behavior of the
measure over tiwme, we can evaluate the extent of homogenization.
Just looking at the data at one point in tim, however, indicates
thant substantial concentration exists. Between the top and bottom ten
departmnrts, ranked on moet consumption and production per capita indices,
there is a difference of a factor of two (incme) to three or four (doctors),
The concentration of gross consumption indices (not "per capita") is,
of course, much greater.
The extent of concentration can also be understood from a comparison
of the Lorenz reasure for several indices for a single year. For the gross
indices, the concentration of consumption indices is substantially greater
than that of population, a pattern consistent with the concentration of
per capita irices.
This concentration has been produced, we suggest, by the process of
urbanization and industrialization. Ina an earlier chapter, it was demronstratAd
that urbanization as highly related to per capita consumption measures.
Even before indu.strialization the city had a control function in gvernmet,
trrla, and education, and -as thereby able to have far greater "per capita"
4 Details of measuremnit will be found in Appendix A.
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resources than the dispersed rural popul ation. industrialization initially
accentuated this pattern throug. technological and economic constraInts that
required a concentiation of' men and materiata.
Today, concentration is less relevant technologically. There bas
been a sharp decline in the relative costs of transport and commication
in consumption as well as production These econoaic and tecbnol ogical.
factors are not sufficient, however, to predict that the pattern of concentra-
tion vil be reversed. in fact substantial evidence pcints in an opposite
direction. These range from the social psychological, vide the preference
of professionals for existing urban envirormnents, to the structural, de
the rcumsance that the cost of comuting is borne by the comuter and,
the state rather than the employer?
We would nonetheLess argue that an important motivational chang3e has
taken place in rura) France, in whIch the devel opment of the nass media
has necessaril1y played an irmortant and accelerating part in the reinforceen
pattern of comunicattin Tn the pasvt 20 years, we believe, r&
France has largely abandoned psyChic restrictions that limited consumption,
curbed productivity, and. restraIned )utvard- mLobiJty. Today, as we reeled
for the bakers, many shackes have been loosed. The rapid decrease in the
pKyhic differences between c~ity man and rural man has permitted the latter
to accelerate !hi consumption relative to the former. This acceleration Is
synonymous with the decrease in conctratio and, hence, in regional differnces
See J)sniel ell, The nd o-of 'deology, pp., 268-170 (CoLLier reie
edition, Ne 'York, 1962
C For extensiv discussion of tht poAnt, see Laurence Wyie, "ocial
Change at the Grass Roots," in Stanley Hft an et al ,n Sear; ch of France
Mass, 963)
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Population nonetheless continues to concentrate. Departments with
large populations almst always have large cities (the important exceptions
are in Brittany). These cities have, in absolute terms, accounted for most
of the increases in population and production. The leaders in population
grovth are Seino-et-Oise (Paris), Alpes-Maritimes (Nice), and Meurthe-et-
Moselle (Nancy). The process has probably been reinforced by increases
in the rural propensity to outward mobility where the new wants are no
longer satisfied by the old resources. A significant indicator is the
endorsement by the Centre National des Jeunes Agriculteurs (national
assaociation of young farmers) of a reduction in the number of farmersJ
In turn, rural depopulation has meant the elimination of marginal producers
and consequent increases in rural productivity while the influx to the cities
should have operated to restrain urban vage increases.
What is surprising is that other gross measures do not follow the
pattern set by population. Radios, automobile radios, low and high tension
electricity, cinema atterance, and gasoline all declined in concentration
between 1954 and 1960. 8 There were slight rises in concentration for doctors,
7. See Jean Maynaud, La R6olte Pasanne (Paris, 1963), pp. 174-75.
8. For statistical data used in this study, see L N
.
S.E.E4, Ainuaire
Statistique de la Prance (Paris):
Gasoline, 1954, Vol 62, 1956,. p.129;
Gasoline, 1960, voL 68, 1962, p.127;
Doctor, dentists, 1954, Vol. 62, 1956, p. 4 5;
Doctors, dentists, 1960, Vol. 68, 1962, p.43
See Office National Interprofessionel des Cereals, Sous-Direction
des Affaires Techniques et Economiques, mimeographed distribution,
for bread consunption. See also pp. 21, 22, 24, in Part L
deaciosand t&ePPhon~ei3 Nit these risefi WieIT e'Iow j~t fol Ppi .a'.
Ott per capi ta 'baste. t.here are declinee. for t v!, o the abv w8eeU-ar
exc'ept for a. zsttnr riae in telephne 4e ~Wil l
declines on any given varlable are quite nwinor irn C-%=paison to the tkia
gar bet,-wc-n 'the Jh*54L~ e.nd Icowest depa.-.bnte, the r- ve of~ FiecoacentratUon
is~ of the zzi e order as the r'ate of concentr'ation of' papulatdon,, a pro'ess
=.-o bsevc-r mould term "rapid.. It, ie, perhaps of &reat moraze that
the aistorlea - trend to concentiation bas k eer reversed tn France and that.
th1.a rev1.r;raaL has ocur-tred. conestently across a variety of inaiiees.
Mhe '~tenof &concentration is. ev, cderee& by t,,V r.amle] flrm~m
zlm-t utttanizeation rate is no longer relate~d to~ -he GrovLh rwle of (,ua
esiniTion vuiAtdee. Th~.a cant.-cwts wltl. the picture prere~ted In
Chapter I -m-here -tbe static eNel of urtmization is to nuorre3&te
-11 ei wth BosI~tut toay there ie no &Ouc eIttow~hi p
~e te e i t e sa lftrAb. 'es We found i,- nissoclationa betveie. the Con-
st&4)tloEL vairle a Qd owr -rbanizati~on ra~ce measurms. 'Table .J
coctsds smLc tnpkal cses
~Ti., 2.1
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Figure 2.1. Homogenization in the French Departmentas 1954-1960
Per Capita Indices
(For each item, the first bar represents 195%, the
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Doctors per capita, 1954-1960
58 4
42 58
Gasoline per capita, 1954-1960
58 42
2 5
Part of the lack of association might seem to stem fron the pattern
of urbanization coupled with net population loss that is occurring mst
notably in Brittany and the Mssif Central. A large component of the
high urbanization rate in these areas is rural depopulation which in-
creases the urban percentage even if the cities fail to grow. Yet the
same process would also yield increases in per capita consumption of
radios, electricity, and doctors, all of which have higher levels of
consumption in cities and towns than in rural conmunes. In fact the
demographically declining departments with high urbanization were amng
the haghest in increase in per capita consumption. Tnerefore, if
"dysfunctional" urbanization by rural depopulation was discounted there
would even be a slight negative relationship between urbanization rate
and consumption increase rates!
In fact the departments increasing most rapidly on "per capita"
indices are often the least dynamic demographically, in terms of net
population growth rate. Mobility from rural regions to urban regions
las contributed to the trend toward homogenization. This is shown in
Table 2,2, where the same measures tabulated with urbanization rate
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The pattern of population growth, then, like the pattern of urban-
ization and the behavior of the Lorenz masure of concentration suggests
an increasing hcmgenization of modernization. Another signpost of
changing process is that the pattern of urbanization itself has shifted
radicaUy in the postwar periodo The census has been taken in 1946,
1954, and 1962. Urbanization rates in the second eight-year interval
were unrelated to those in the first (Table 2.1). Part of the explara-
ion for this result lies in an important geographic shIft. The immediate
pcastwar period witnessed the reconstruction and repopulation of the
heaviily damaged Northlteat. Reconstruction helped boost urbanization
rates along the Channel (Calvados, Seine-Maritime, Pas de Ce1s) and
/along the Belgian frontier (Nord, Ardennes, Meuse) - Low urbanization, in
contrast, was concentrated west of the famous line from Rouen to Marseile.
The later period, 1954-1962, showed urbanization ordered, not by
reconstruction, but by the developing urban regions of France. Of the
34 most rapidly urbazing departments, 8 were located in a block around
Paris, 8 more in a block running through the Alps from Lyon to Nice and
Marseille, and 7 in a third block centered on Toulouse. Low urbanization
rate had become dispersed geographically. Clearly the old geographic
stereotypes about "static" France and "dynamic" France had lost their
meaIng .
There were also bshifts rithin regions, in the rapidly urbanizing
Southeast, urbanization in the Dr~v and Vaucluse slowed down frm -the
first period to the second while there was an increse in Haute Savoie
and Var.9 This "balancing" auggeets that growth is generalized throughout
an entire urban region.
Table 2-3






The development of urban regions rather than "natural" regions and
the trend towami more equal. 1ving standards amaong the departmnats cannot
9,. Our statistics ay accentuate differences in what iv possibly a more
uniform process of urbanization. However, a moare uniform prcmess would
only Indicate further homogenIzatio n1
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escape having important consequences for polities. That these ecological
changes are but one of many factors affecting political outcmes precludes
judging their total effect without considerable multivariate analysis.
In certain situations, however, the influence of ecological factors can
be assessed rather directly.
Suggestively, one effect ill be the homgenization of regional
elites into a national elite. On iportant policy questions, there viUl
be less of a tendency for opinion to follow geography. In Part I it as
demonstrated that the vote to defeat EDC in 1954 did not follow "natural
regions," but was instead related to urbanization. For highly haogeneous
elite populations, even the urban-rural differences no longer appear
important.
The ehsence of urbn-rural differences is shown in two surveys
condaucted by the Institute of European Studies shortly after the defeat
of EDC, in 1955.10 One was of sr = 00 students at "EX," the leading
French business school, and the other involved 70.0 leading French bus-
inessmen, members of the Patronat. In both these groups, the respondents
were clased by place of birth. This variable did not discriminate
between suppoters and opponents of MC0 or any other European-linked
issue. While there was a general tendency for the more irban to be less
"European" then those born in rural places, In no case was the difference
significant.' On maitters of Eurcpan policy, neither the present nor
10. Sponsoredr by CiES, .& TX., rdirzcted by Professor Daiel Lerner.
11. Under CW-Square at the ,05 level. See Robert Ralson, "Begional
Stulies of the Ggrndes Ecolt 'nd the Patronats." (internal
mmorandum).
the future French businesa elite can be profitably treated in terms of
regional attituiaal groups.
Despite a tendency to homogenization, ecological factors will still
be very belpful in accounting for political behavior, particularly voting,
hen they either reflect the dynamies of the hogenization process itself
or, as statis, indicate political phoeana of relatively perranent
duration.
The dyrnic cae is nicely demonstrated by FKoajalism, an important
political movement of the fifties. This movement was directly related to
the spread of urbanization and moernization over the entire territory
of France, It reached its electoral peaks in regions that contained a
substantial rural population but vhere there as also an urban sector
that could contribute to a rapid rise in expectations. The interaction
between city and country reflects the possible tensions of an homogenization
Commuism in contrast is not patterned. after the current ecological
dic but.i aiter the statics that accompanled its mpflantation in the
ties and thirtles. Its percentage of the national vote has remined
relativelj stable, yet it has been favored by demographic trends. There
has been high population growth in most of the Comunist urban strongiolds ,
Accordingly, Counism, with an ideology vacuous for the modern Frenchn,
maintaine itself by its organisational strength. The vote is stable,
but mountumn has been lost.
The ind of regional diversity wA imearn the development of a fully
national politlcal systemo The detailed analyses of Pouadismn and
Comrardam tat follow are case studies in the characteristics of the
polity,
Methodological Appendix
A. The Measurement of Urbanization Rate
No measure of growth is completely "perfect." We have long been
accustomed to expressing growth rates of national incomes in percentages.
Yet if we wish to use this measure as a standard of performnce, as a bill
of health for the economy, the simple percentage measure might be heavily
biased against highly developed nations if it could be shown that saturation
was inevitable in any economy. Under these conditions we couldn't expect a
fully developed economy to grow as fast as one of lesser development,
and any rough comparison of percentage growth rates would be misleading.
A case of saturation obviously exists with such statistics as the
percentage urban which cannot exceed "100%". The department of the Seine
has attained this level and other departments are approaching it. To
simply compute the growth rate of the percentage urban would provide a
standard of performance highly biased against urban departments. A similar
argument can be made against computing the negative growth rate of the
percentage rural. A conventional method of elminating bias is to measure the
growth rate as the percentage change in the statistic u , where u
100 - u
represents the percentage urban.
Nonetheless, one might argue that the measure defined above is biased
against the departments of "medium" urbanization (near 50%). However, if one
assumes that growth of urbanization follows the "S" shaped sigmoid curve
1. The Seine was assigned the urbanization rate of the Seine-et-Oise.
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were "u" changes slowly in very rural situations and accelerates until
a maxim= is reached at 50f, followed by a subsequent slowing down -- then
the measure defined is an unbiased standard of performance. Our investigations
have disclosed that historically urban growth does accelerate in the
neighborhood of 50% urban. Furthermore, there is today no significant
relationship between urbanization rate (as defined) and the level of urbaniza-
tion, in conformity with the signoid model. We have thus decided to accept
percentage change in u as a reasonable measure of urbanization rate.
100 - u
For the percentage urban we have used the percentage of the population
living in towns where over 2,000 persons live "agglomerees au chef-lieu.
This is the official government definition. While other definitions also
based on population ratios (such as the percentage in towns 25,000 or over) would
change specific tabulations, they should not change our general conclusions
For population and the consumer variables, saturation levels are
sufficiently distant that ordinary percentage growth rates can be used
without significant bias.
B. The Lorenz measure of concentration
Population and the consumption variables are approximately log-
normally distributed, where the logaritm of the statistic is normally
distributed. Under these conditions, an estimate of the Lorenz measure is
given directly as a monotonic function of the standard deviation of the
logarithmic variate, independent of the mean. Precisely,
L = 2N ( / 0,1) - 1
where v represents the standard deviation, L the Lorenz measure, and N the
normal distribution function.2
See J. Aitchison and J A.C. Brown, The Lognormal Distributton (Cambridge,
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The discussion in Part I suggests that the failure of traditional
categories of analysis to account for the modernization of France prompted
the use of new sets of variables and the identification of urban regions
to describe the salieat features of France today. In Part II, the behavior
of the new variables and their role in eroding traditional regionalism was
examined. In Part IT, selected case studies demonstrate the power of the
new variables to account for political phenomena, especially when they are
used in a aultivariate framework of analysis.
The defeat of the EAuropean Defense Conmuity is illuminated by adding
the urban voting pattern to the analysis. Poujadism, examined in the
second case study, is seen as an outgrovth of the process of development
described in Part IT. Though only the first phase of research is reported
here, the Conmunist case study emphasizes the importance of the urban
dimension, but onlyv in the context of other forces. All cases emphasize
the need for scholars to apply miltivariate analysis when dealing with
the complex of many forces which inateract in the modernizing process,
'E DETA OF E.D.C.
A Case Stiy in the Regional Analysis of Old French Politics
The defeat of EDC was a major event. For the supporters of European
unity it was cataclysmic, for the adversaries it was a decisive triumph.
All agreed on the importance of the decision, but few agreed on its explan-
ation. Why the same National Assebly, which proposed the EDC in 1950,
rejected it in 1954--this became a matter of intense public debate for
several years after the event. Efforts to explain the defeat of EDC
turned naturally to regional categories of analysis. But, while coen-
tators agreed that the political geography of France must contain the
explanation, they differed sharply in hypothesizing a partucular geo-
graphical exp3anation
In order to test the principal regional hypotheses about the defeat
of EDC we mapped the actual 'distribution of the votes in the National
Assembly by departments. These maps are reproduced in the next pages.
Map A shows whether each department voted for or against the D)C, by a
relative or absolute majority. Map B shows the departmental distribution
without the Communist votes (since the Communists voted a national "line"
and thus presumably obscured regional differences). Map C shows the de-
partmental distribution of the 94 Socialist votes. When assembled in
this way, the actual distribution of votes proves that each of the three
principal hypotheses based on political geography is wrong! The regional
)assumption underlying each hypothesis simply does not correspond with
the facts.
Each of these hypotheses was advocated by a former French Prdsident
du Conseil who had held office during the years of debate over the EDC.
Their failure to explai what really happened- -i.e., to account for the
actual distribution of votes--indicates that public confidence in political
geography may be misplaced. It suggests, further, that regionalism may i1n
fact have lost its power as an explanatory system under the conditions of
personal mobility and social change in contemporary France--i.e.,, Vhere
they live is no longer the main thing to know about people. We shall
consider in turn the three hypotheses, the assumptions on which they rest,
and their correspondence with the facts.
The first hypothesis, advocated by former President Joseph Laniel,
maintaiied that French votes on EDC were determined by basic attitudes
toward Germany. Accordingly, the regions of France most strongly opposed
to EDC were thooe which had suffered the most from German military power
in the past. On this hypothesis the region northeast of Paris, historic
route of German in ions, should present a solid bloc of departments
voting7 agai-nt E1C 0n the contrary, the regior was sharply divided.
WIhen the Communist votes are eliinated, the &vision is precisely equal
between departments ahowing a cleax rajority for and against DIC (12 de-
partments each). The two departments of Alsace were divided, Bas nin
voting for and Haut-Rhin voting against. Ardennes was so divided inter-
ally as to cast no decisive majority on either side of the cuestion, Marne,
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historic battleground against Gern invaders, voted an absolute mjority
for EDO.
The second mjor hypothesis, advocated by former President Rene Pleven
under whose name the EDC treaty was initiated, asserted that the regiona
line of division lay between the departraents of central France as ccmpared
with the frontier departments. This hypothesis is akin to the traditional
American distinction between the "isolationist Middle West" and the "inter-
nationalist" coastal states. It rests on the theory that interior regions
form insular political judgments, whereas border regions reflect their
constant contact with the outer world in a greater political "internatiun-
alism." On many French issues, this theory has some explanatory value.
But it is clearly refuted on EDC by the actual distribution of parliamentary
votes. As is shown by Map A (,67), the tallies for border departements and
le Centre were as follows:
PARLI/LEi V01lB ON EDC
Number of Departments
For Against Abstained Total
Border Depatemvnts 15 20 4 39
LeCentre 6 6 315
The facts, then, clearly refute both parts of this hypothesis. The border
1. Against: Allier, Creuse, L.Vienne, Puy de Dome (absolute majority);
Cher, Nievre (relative majority)
For: Cantal, IL Loire, Vienne (relative majority); Dordogne, Sane,
Loire (absolute mjority)
Abstained: Charente, Correze, Indre
departments of France dIvided, but with a distinct majority voting gainst
EDC. Hence the "interniationalist I perspectivBe of the border areas, what-
ever may be the case on other issues, did not operate on EDC. So, too, the
"isolationist" departmerts of the center divided with arithmetical precision.
While le Centre is not precisely defined in French political geography, a
glance at Map A shows that these proportions shift even further counter-
hypothesis (for ED) if one adds the next "ring" of departments to the
central core. We are forced to conclude that if "cosmopolitanism" was the
issue, then clearly it was not distributed along regional lines.
The third i. hypothesis, publicly endorsed by former President Georges
Bidault, asserted that the political cleavage on EDC followed the line
which separates the "static" outh from the "dynamic" north of France.
This view, which corresponds to the traditional Anrican distinction
between the progressive irdustrial North and the retarded agricultural
South, cannot be made to fit any ma showing the actual distrroution of
fED votes. The most specific form of this hypothesis was advanced by
Andr6 Phtilip, who stated that northeast of the linc drawn between Rouen
arn Marscilles lay dynamic France, southvest of that line lay static
Frace. A look at our mps shov, however, that the EDC vote paid scant
respect to thiAjs' line. Northeast of the line, in at, two solid blocs
comprising 15 departments show at absolute -ma jority aginst EDC South-
west of the line, 16 departments voteod for EDC. The non-regional shape of
the vote i oven clearer on Map B, whaich eliminates the Crmmunist votes.
The Socialist deputies, who included M. Philip, distributed their votes in
the same non-regional pattern as shown in Map C. The line Rouen-Marseille
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does not account for the voting distribution any better than a line drawn
in the opposite direction. But iC the Rouen-Marseille line is false, its
traverse is meaningless. Nor has any other line dividing regional France
according to some dichotomous scheme been suggested that provides a valid
and significant accounting for the EDC voting distribution.
Urbanism and EDC
As the final bit of data we shall incorporate in this report, we
conclude with a look at the old EDC issue in the new terms of urban regions.
Since the traditional political geography based on natural regions had
failed so completely to explain the defeat of EDC, could the concept of
urban regions provide a more satisfactory account of this great national
event? We began by simply crosa-tabulating the votes of the 90 departments
with their rank (1, 2, 3) on urbanism in 1954--i.e., the year of the vote.
The result is shown in Table 1:
Table 1. Urbanism and EC
EDC Vote
Pro Mixed Con
1: 7 4 23
Urbanism 7
3: 16 1
This is indeed a startling result, the more so as it is so clear.
Contrary to the assution underlying all the regionalisct hypotheses, the
rural departments had mainly voted for EDC and the urban deparntments ha d
1. Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, eds., France Defeats EDC (New York,
1957), p. 203.
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mainly voted n EDC--and the more highly urbanized, the more clearly
was their opposition expressed. If EDC divided static from dynamic France,
then clearly the division went in the direction opposite to that hypothe-
sized--static France supported it and dynamic France opposed it.
This finding proved such a delightful paradox that we. were tempted to
close our report at this point. However, curiosity triumphed. Aware
that Comniuiist strength massed against EDC would count most heavily in
the most urban departments, we recomputed the EDC vote without counting
the Communists (as we had done in testing the earlier hypotheses).
Tale 2. Urbanism, EDC, Cormaunism2
EDC Vote
Pro Mixed Con
1: 15 6 13
Urbanism 2: 12 9 12
3: 16 3 4
The distribution in Table 2 shows that the Communist impact was heaviest
in the cities, and that this impact probably played a major role in the
defeat of ED. Omitting the Communists reduces the anti-EDC vote from a
victorious 47 to a vaqi shed 29. It is specifically the urban vote
against EDC that diminishes sharply when the Comnwists are omitted--a
drop of 10 in the high urban and 6 in the middle urban, as compared with
only two in the low urban (i.e., rural).
2. 1id., p. 204
There are two lessons at least suggested by thesc tables. First,
urban regions account better than natural regions for the political geog-
raphy of France today. Second, Comunism has developed as an integral
part of urbanism in contemporary France. But these lessons, in turn,
raise new questions. Why has Communism come to play so large a role in
French city life? Are all the conditions which prcmoted this situation
present in the newly-emerging urban regions? Evidence in the last test
case points to the changing position of comunism in the urban regions.
Which are the conditions whose presence or absence changes this situation
in the new urban regions that are shaping the future of French life? To
these questions we have no final answers. But answers can, and should,
be found.
POUJADE'S VOTERS
A Case Study in the Social Geogranhy of New French Politics*
Initiated as organized resistance to tax collection, the
following of Pierre Poujade developed into an electoral movement
that won 9.2% of the vote and 52 seats in the French elections
of 1956.3 Although invalidations later reduced these 52 seats to
41, the Poujadist deputies, when added to an increased Communist
con.tingent, seriously compromised the parliamentary process in
the Fourth Republic.
Poujade, the unknown spokesman of the non-elite, left his
transient but damaging imprint on the French political system.
A number of social scientists have attempted to analyze his
electoral success primarily as a function of social and economic
factors, secondarily as a function of the electoral success of
varioDs parties in the 1951 elections.2
* This work was supported by the Center for International
Studies, M.I.T., and the N.IT.-Earvard Joint Center for Urban
Stidies. In the terminal phase, the author benefited from a
Social Science Research Council Fellowship. Computations were
nade at the ,..I.T. Computation Center.
I Voting percentages in this paper are always based on the
number of inscrits (regIstered voters).
2 See (the pages pertaining to the analysis of Poujadist voting
are indicated -in parentheses) Stanley Hoftfman, et al. Le touvement
Poujade (Parls, 196) (189-2O8) Me urice Duverger, Francois Goguel,
and Jean Touchard, eds., Les Elections du 2 Janvier 1956 (Paris,
1957), especially the articsF-eph~~TaispF~KTatzmann "~Oomortement
diectoral et classe sociale," pp 25)4-285 (275-276), Jean Labbens
"Les sle :tions de 1946, 1951, et 1956 a Lyon," pp. 307-321 (315-
316), Christian Prieur "La Campagne 61ectorale dlans lIAv3yron,"
pp- 322-352 (3&2-3b8), Claude Leieu " L a geographie des partis dans
lIstre apres les diections du 2 janvier 1956,' pp. 369-395 (:390-
394), Francois Goguel "Note Compl6mentaire," pp. i120-b22 (420-21),
and Francois Goguel, "Gfographie des 61ections du 2 janvier," op.
467-505 (477-482); Jacques Fauvet et Henri Mendras, eds., Les
Paysans et La Politique 'Paris, 1958), especially the articles of"
These variant interpretations start from certain commonly-
accepted facts about Poujade and Poujadism: Poujade owned a small-
town bookstore in one of the poorest regions of France; most of
the militants in the movement were also commercants; the two groups
who voted most heavily for Poujade, the commercants and the tarmers,
were those most hurt by the postwar economic growth pattern of
France in terms of big, concentrated firms; Poujadism won only a
small fraction of the votes in the developed high-growth Northern
region between Paris and the Belgian frontier.
As a group the commercants or it boureois had been,
especially in the South of Prance, among the heaviest supporters
of the "system" of the Third Republic. In both ideology and policy,
the Third Republic had stood for the protection of the small, in-
dependent business or farm. In the fifties, these values were
under attack, and Fourth Republic politics served to make difficult
what might have occurred less painfully. Thus, it was an easy step
to portray the Poujadist voter as a traditional creature giving a
final, Fascist-tinged outburst at economic forces beyond his con-
trol and adaptive capacity.
The implication drawn from such an analysis of Poujadism was
that Poujade's voters ought to come from poor areas, in economic
and demographic decline, and especially from areas overstocked with
commercants. Such statements are at best, however, half-truths.
Joseph Klatzmann "G~ographie Slectorale de lagriculture frangaise,"
pp 39--68 (59-60), Jean-Michel Royer "De Dogires * Poujade," pp.
149-206 (201-203), and Pierre Poujol and S.-R. Schram Le
protestantisme rural: traditions, structures, et tendances
poIittiques," pp. 361-385 (383).
The strongest statement of any accuracy along these lines was
that Poujade failed to score heavily in the thirty (out of ninety)
most modern departnents. Stanley Hoffman and his associates
acknowledged that, "If It is thus shown that Poujadism hardly
succeeded in penetrating the departments with high productivity
or high incomie per capita, one can not by contrast affirm that it
had an outstanding success in the least productive or the most
poor departments.' 3
What is interesting is that Poujadisma did have great success
in transitional departments at intermediate levels of development.
But the tendency to think in terms of dichotomous relationships
prevented many observers from investigating this phenomenon.
Even in the m-ost rural and agricultural departments, Poujade
had considerably greater success in the more "dynamic" departments
of this group, These departments, since their population is
typically not in decline, have a relatively small percentage of
commercants. Thus, as we shall show, the "commercant" inter-
protation of Poujadisn as a social movement is not consistent with
data In the rural departments, for example, farmers had to vote
Poujadist in large nurbers for a Poujadist success to occur, The
"comiercant" interpretation creates the expectation that this
would occur in the relatively "static" (non-growth) departments.
We may ask why, on the contrary, this happened more often with
farmers in the relatively Bynarmic" (high-growth) departments,
3 Hoffman, p, citt, p. 19)6.
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More generally, we may rethink the feeling that Poujadism
is a vestigial residue of the traditional French "petit," in-
capable of adaptation to the postwar world. We may ask if the
Poujadists, instead of being just passive traditionalists, were
not often men making a real and adaptive transition in response
to the demands of postwar life in "dynamic" France.
In a fascinating (albeit Marxist-biased) book about French
agriculture, Serge Mallet has given a highly concrete example of
such transitional activity among French peasants:
2000 peasants of the canton of Ambert Luy-de-Dome) ..
signed a petition envisaging:
a) The creation of a fixed zone for woodlands,
b) The institution of a society of land manage-
management taking responsibility for the
administration of all the cultivatable land
of the canton and proceeding to a redivision
of land by eliminating from the new allotment
all absentee owners,
How did H. P.Q, a young Catholic peasant, of reactionary
tradition, take the initiative for such a movement?
How did 2000 peasants--in a canton which in the elec-
tions of 1956 gave 60% of the vote to the extreme-right
Poujadists and Independent -sub &cribe to such an action
against the right of property?
There is good evidence, then, that Poujadism is not a
simple reaction to change elsewhere but is itself a complex
process of social change in postwar France. 1t is worthwhile
therefore, before proceeding to a quantitative analysis of voting
statistics, to reorient the interpretation of the Poujadist move-
ment in this sense,
4 Serge Mallet, _Les Paysans Contre Le Pass_ (Paris, 1962), p. 37.
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Poujaists: Frenchmen in Transition
Viewed from one level, Poujadism does manifest a reaction of
traditional values to modernization. To a world of increasing
economic concentration and government controls is opposed the
tidy cormunity of the boutique and a stable clientele. And of
all Western nations, France has been the nation of the small-scale
economy.
In the accelerated change of postwar France, the small-scale
economy undergoes constant constraint and frequent destriction.
Politics, furthermore, only hindered an intelligent cutting of
the economic cake. The tax law appeared to favor workers over
self-employeds in the same income bracket. In postwar France the
industrial modern sector played its trmps while the old middle
classes had no effective political organization.
When, in such an atmosphere of threatened loss of self-
employed status, the old tax structure is operated with new
vigor, rural Prance reacts. Poujadism reacted to the whole
array of syfbols of modernization: the trusts, big business,
international finance, Prisunics, concentration of commerce,
centralization of consumption, nationally advertised prices,
quick changes In product, cooperatives, nationalizations, labor
unions, civil servants, adinistrative controls in agriculture,
large cities, experts, permarch.s, liberalization of foreign
trade ("frozen chickens"), technicians, machine production, organ-
ization of the movies, To these negative symbols, as protest
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became demagoguery, were added a nastier set: "nationalism" in
the colonies, Jews, intellectuals, the press, the elite, foreigners,
immigrants.5
In this schema of reaction, those most severely affected by
modernization, the poorest of the middle classes, put their votes
against the Fourth Republic.
Even in this schema, however, poverty and depopulation need
not be taken as the basis for the Poujadist votes. It evidently
would be equally valid to assume that those areas where the con-
trast between the modern and the traditional is greatest became
the most heavily Poujadist. These areas, as our studies show,
are not the poorest and most depopulated.
On this showing, the interpretation of Poujadism as a simple
reaction to modernization needs to be challenged. An important
concept to bear in mind is that very different latent attitude
structures can produce the same "decision" in a forced-choice
situation such as an election--some people will vote for Kennedy
because he is Catholic while others will vote for him, at least
in part, because he opposes federal aid to parochial schools.
For Poujadists, we know that their pre- and post- Poujade
electoral behavior was extremely diverse. A public opinion poll
of the French Institute of Public Opinion (I.F.O.P.) in March of
1957 gave their probable 'bost-Poujade" electoral decisions:
5 Descriptive information about Poujadism has been drawn
from Hoffman, 2P. cit. passim.
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of every 100 former Poujadist voters roughly 8 would vote Socialist,
5 Radical, 3 M.R.P., 20 Independent, 23 ?oujadist, and 5 other
parties. (38 did not know or would not respond.) 6 While the
absence of the Communists is, as we shall show, related to the
geographic distribution of the Poujadist vote in the 1956 election,
for the moment we stress only the otherwise heterogeneous character
of the movement.
Similarly, while some Poujadist votes may be interpreted as
a response to the loss of a business or farm, or to the defense
of les positions acquises, many Poujadists were drawn from highly
mobil.e occupations such as transportation. Here is an area where
small business has been expanding since the war. Yost people who
owned trucks in rural areas and small towns left another occupation
to do so. These people conceivably voted Poujade because their
expectations of upward mobility had been dramatically accelerated.
Analogous cases can be made for the farm population. Many
farmers, over-receptive to government and private advertising cam-
paigns, were bold enough to buy tractors that could not be efficiently
operated on the small, unconnected plots typical in much of France.
When these farmers cannot meet their credit payments and are
irged by Poujadist propaganda to vote against "les gros," they are
hardly a traditional type, In general, agricultural. France has
not been unresponsive to techaological pronise. The expectations
6 Sondages, 19, 3, 1957, p. 11.
7 The point has been documented by VMal3et In Les Pa as Contre
cit.,assim. Laurence Wylie gives confirming evidence:
one of the atisais who have lost their trade are bitter, and. Pierre
Poujade made the most of this bitterness. Nevertheless they seem to
share the pride the French feel in the technological advance of their
ammintpvi" "sort ai Change at the Grass Roots" in S. Hoffman et, a_
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produced by technology were much greater than the returns produced
by the French economy.
The economic experiences of Poujadist voters then seem to be
as diverse as their political histories. There is similar contrast
in communications behavior, for, although many of the symbols of
Poujadist conmunications are those of the traditional right, its
over-all communications structure closely resembled that of modorn
revolutionary extremism; the combination of "high dissciation
from institutions and ideologies with a high degree of interaotion
among people."899 The high dissociation of the Poujadists is
widely acknowledged, "Sortez les Sortants" ("Throw out the In-
cu-mbents") was their slogan. We can easily Infer that a high
degree o' Interaction took place. Unliko the traditional French
right, the Poujadists were everything but a party of notables
or local elite, In fact, the national organizatIon of comm1ercars
opposed Poujade. Thus, Poujadism was denied the normal channels
of communication and consequently operated with more direct personal
communication than is usually the case for French politics. Only
direct interaction, largely facilitated by the introduction of the
automobile in rural France, would explain the rapid growth of
Poujad ism.
The contrasts betweefn Poujadists in politics, economics, and
conmunications nonetheless have a common specification in the
8 Daniel Lerner, The Passng of TraditIonal SgceTl (G.lenco,
9 Sz K. Lipset has noted the "revolutionary" aspect to PoujCAist
ideology, which he contrasts with that of De Gaulle who identifies
rmuch more directly with the conservation of traditional values ee
his Politica Mpan :'New York, 199), pp. 1i-163.
matrix of social change. This specification In turn explains the
geographic distribution of Poujadist voting.
The key to Poujadism as an electoral, movement lies in the con-
text of social change from 1946 to 1956. The following elements
were Important for our purposes:
(1) There was an Important movement off the land and into
the cities. Not only the Paris region grew rapidly, but also
secondary cities with populations around 10,000, 20,000, or above
had high increases, At the same time, rural regions surrounding
these cities either grew less rapidly or lost in popuilation. The
growth of the cities ought to have had two important effects:
First, new life-styles were cormunicated to the rural population
(mass media and tourists had a similar function), thus siltaneously
increasing rural readiness to Innovate and increasing the expec-
tation that the rural people themselves would acquire the new
1ife-styles. At the same time, non-agricultural incomes rose
faster than agricultural; people with the right kinds of businesses
in the right kinds of towns were more prosperous than people with?
inefficient operations in declining villages. Hence, important
differentials in satisfactions or returns matched the rapid Increase
in expectations,
On the one hand, the process just described was unimportant
elect orally in areas already highly uSbanized bec only a smal
fraction of the population came from riuture or smal,-tow
businesses, At the other extreme, in regions without importan
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deve.oping centers, there were no cities to intensify the imbalance
of expectations and satisfactions. Similarly, grosso modo, mass
media and tourism had made their weakest penetration in these
poorest and stagnant departments, Thus, it seems likely that
Poujadism would have been most successful in departments near the
center of the range of modernization.
(2) At the same time, the political system of the Fourth
Republic resulted in a growth of popular dissociation from its
institutional framework. Small business and small agriculture did
not have representative interest articulation. At the time of
.PoIujade, the national farmers' association was controlled by large-
scale investment farming in the Paris and Eastern regions. The
government, trying for an increase in economic power, attempted
to collect taxes that had previously been left uncollected; hence,
the birth of Poujadism as a movement to run the tax-collector out
of town,
One group faced higher dissociation than others. Governiment
attempted to control the production of small distillers. Mendes-
France launched a large-scale campaign against alcoholism. There
had been some bad years. Wine-growers remembered these things when
they went to the polls.
'3) Given dissociation, discontent rmst be channelled
electorally. Only the Cumunist party provided irrpootant compe-
tition to Poujade as a claimant for the dissociated. The Communist
party functions as a massive organization for the expression of
urban, particularly worker, dissociation. Thus, the Cormmunists
represent an organizational as well as an ideological imzpasse for
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Poujadism in highly urban areas. Similarly, in areas of rural
Communism, where dissociation occurred prior to the Poujade move-
ment, we can expect the Communist organization to have prevented
Poujadist electoral success.
The preceding points can be summarized before beginning the
statistical examination of election results. As a consequence of
demographic, economic, and communication patterns, Poujadism should
have been most successful in departments at an intermediate level
of development or industrialization. Conditional to the major
modernization level, two further factors should be important:
the strength of the Communist party and the proportion of the
population involved in wine-growing.
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Poujade's Voters*
The analysis of voting statistics presented here aims at
showing the potential relevance to voting studies of three inputs
that have not been systematically considered by French electoral
sociologists. These inputs include (1) the effects of relative
levels of modernization on expectation-reward balance; (2) inhib-
itory effects of one party's prominence in a region on another
party's ability to marshal votes in the region (Communists vs.
Poujadists in our case); (3) high electoral saliency of particular
issues in particular regions that are tangential to the elite's
central image of the e3cctoral campaign (central government
communications and the production difficulties in grapes-and-wine
regions in our case). It will be shown that these three elements
* Notes on Computational and Statistical Techniques
A. The "average" Poujadist vote is always the unweighted
average. This means that departments (or cantons) of unequal
population were counted equally. The procedure was adopted be-
cause we wished to focus on regional variations. Each department
then reflects an "experiment" made under varying conditions; th e
experimental result is ths Poujadist vote.
B. In oight departmaits, the Pou1jadists did not preFi r;
candidates. While in some deptrtments the Poujadists were allied
with another party, it was not possible to systematically 'correct"
for the absence of a list, Therefore, we scored these dopartmeents
all as zero. Two factors would seem to account for th'e absence of
lists: (1) Lack of support; (2. Success of older parties in channel-
ing Poujadist sentiment. Neither factor would imply that the zero
scores are distortions,
C. The distribution of percent Poujadist vote over the depart-
ments is skewed, yet the zero scores preclude a logarithic or
logit transformation. Therefore, in testing for d be-
tween two sets of departments, we computed not only tet Tes,,t,
which assumes normality, but also a non-parametric tost, the Mann-
Whitney U Test. The t Test results are shown as p(t), while the
U Test appears as p(U).
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can be most profitably explored in a multivariate context. Also
explicit in the analysis is the inadequacy of single-variate
explanations, especially those related to poverty, the decline
of regions, and the decline of the etit bo r -s class.
The method of inrference here relies on comparing the Poujadist
vote in departments that have been placed in dichotomous or tri-
chottomous categories along some dimension, Withevident loss of
generality, more porful statistical analyais was deliberately
avoided in order to sirlfplify the riscussion.
The strength of the Foujadist vote, our findings show (see
Tab]le 1), was strongly related to the balance between the agricul-
tural populat ion cd the nonagricultural population ,in the
inermedi;ate de1partrents, In transition between a predo m'inantly
agricultural ec-onomy and a predominantv industrial ecouolny, the
average Poujadist vote was .11,8% as opared to 9 n the highly
agricultural departments, and only 8.25% in the highly industrial.
Similarly, per capita income, utbanism, and population growth all
showed the samre transitional peak although the peak was not z o
Orominent as that of the occupational neasure. While these
differences are nuerically small, they are quite importent at
the margin, "n those departnents where there was only one
circonscription (olectoral district) and which were, hence, not
overly sensitive to the effects o" proportional reprstatio
10
the Piujadfists won 35 seat Only 5 f those st co
10 In the 21 _cgconscriptions of multiple -,Ircnscritig
departments, the Poujadists won 17 seats without ever winning
more thai one per circonscription,
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departments where the Poujadist vcte was less than 101. Clearly
the half "modern"-half "traditiunal" character of many parts of
France had an important influence on the outcome of the 1956
election.
In Table 1, we have also reported the overall effects for
the wine-alcohol issue. The potential saliency of the issue to
the department, measured as registered wine-growers as perent
of the active population also showed important differences in
Poujadist voting strength. The 30 departments with the greatest
involvement in wine and alcohol production showed an average
Poujadist vote of 12.6% as against only 8.3% in the remaining
60 departments. A similar result was obtained for 1n altenaiAVe
index, the nTmber of male voters per rogisterd bouilleur de cru.
We shall show that the "wine-grower index" gives even greater
differences when we eliminate the effect of the percentage of
the population in agriculture.
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TABLE 1
Major Factors in the Poujadist Vote*
Average Poujadist Vote (2)
Departments High"* Middl1* Low** Total 90
A. Modernization
Variates




2. Per Capita Income. 8.6 10,8 9.7 9.7
(1955-1956)
3, Percent Urban. 8.9 10.9 8,6 9.7
(1954)
4 Population Growth 8.5 10.7 9.7 9.7
R ateo. ( 19d6-195b)
3. Win-Alcohol. Variates




2 Bouilleurs de Cru 11.0 10.5 7.4 9.7
per X.ale Voter.
(1951)
Conttiuation of Table 1 on next page
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Table 1 (Continued.)
Results of Significance Tests
Variate Relationship p(t) p(U)
A.1 . MiddleyLow .05 .0002
Middle>ligh .025 .0001
A.2 MiddleOLow - .025
Middle7High .05 -0001
- .05
A:4. Middle>Low - .05
Middle>High .05 .0001
B.1. High>L ow .0005 ,0001
HighPViddle .025 .0001
B.2. High;,Low .01 .0001
MliddlevLow .025 .0002
* Sources: Etudes et Conjonctures, "L'Espace Economique Frangalse"
pecial number 19 ; idem., 1L, 6, (June 1959) pp. 587-
622; Sully Lederman, Alcool, Klcoolisme, Alcoolisation
(Paris, 1953); Annuaire Statistique de la France, Nouv-
elle Serie 6, 158.
** For Al., Ac2., B.2, B.2., the departments are distributed
30-30-30 among the High, Middle, and Low groups, For A.3. and
A.., the distribution is 30-h-O-20.
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To test how relative effects operate in strictly rural
settings, we can use the estimations of the vote of agricualteurs
by department made by Klatzmann.1 2 It should be noted that his
techniques are very approximate.
Again the departments were divided into three groups of 30
each, The variables trichotomized are population growth, urban
growth, and urbanism. In each entry of Table 2, we recorded the
numaber of departments in which 20% or more of the farmers voted
Poujadist. The table indicates that for each of the three dexno-
graphic variables, the intermediate, relatively "dynamic" depart-
ments scored higher than the "static," low category departments,
Ailso, the lows were not substantially higher than the highs on
any of the three measures, and even were somewhat lower on
urbanism, The peaking of Poujadism in the intermediate groups is
clear-cut: on population growth 14 out of .30 intermediate depart-
ments showed 201 or more of their farmers voting Poujadist as
against 7 of the 30 lows. For urban growth, if the cutting points
between categories are rearranged, and the 30 departments from
rank )1 to rank 70 are considered, we find 17 of the 27 departments
with a strong Poujadist vote in this group. Finally, on Urbanism,
18 of 27 are in the 45 most urban departments against 9 of 27 in
the 4 least urban.
The demographic variables then indicate imp ortant differences
in the level of Poujadlst vote among the farmers. The peasant-
farmer is more liltely to be a Foujadist voter in an urban than a
12 Les Pavsans et la lit . cit., pp. 39-67.
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ruxeral department, a reflection, we beleve, of the higher expec-
tations and higher access to communications of the urban-region
farmer. And, in terms of demographic dynamics, the Poujadist
farmer typically comes from a region of intermediate growth rates
where (notwithstanding some correction for birth-rate differentials)
modernization has made sufficient impact to change the expectation-
satisfaction balance, True, our data do not reflect which farmers
voted Poujadist. But given the reports of observers 1ke Mallet
and Wylie, it is a reasonable suggestion that modernization had
made substantial positive impact on these farmers as well as their
regions. Social change mrakes rriscontatement possible but not
inevitable,,
TABLE 2
Poujadism, FIhernization, and Agriculture*
Number of departments in which 20% or more of the farmers voted
Poujadist.
R A N X
High Middle Low Total
Number of Departments: (30) (30) (30) 90
Population Growth
() 1946--1954 6 14 7 27
Urban Population
Growth (%) 1946-1954 7 10 10 27
Urbani - 1954 10 10 7 27
* Urbanism is defined as percentage of populatiTon livig in
towns with 2000 or more living in the major agglomration, Urban
growth is defined as tb percentage growth rcde of the urban
population.
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So far only the more global hypothesis involving relative
economic contrasts has been examined. To proceed to the more
detailed propositions, the distribution involving the percentage
of the active population in non-agricultural occupations was
selected for close examination since the relative strength of rank
"nirdlen was higher in this distribution than in others.
A detailed breakdown of the relationship between "Higb"
Poujadism (defined as 12.5% or more of the registered voters) and
the size of the non-agricultural population is given in Fig. 1.
One-third of the 24 "High" Poujadist departments occur in the
narrow range between 61% and 64% in the secondary and tertiary
sectors, But above this slice, a "threshold" of modernization
appears to be reached--as there are only 3 Poujadist departments
between 65% and 76' and none abovie 761. In the range 61-64, 8 of
13 departments (62) are high Poujadist, yet in the more agricul-
tural departments below 61 only 1.2 of 42 (29t) are high.
The great difference between the two percentages suggested
t.hat highly different circumstances might accompany Poujadism in
the two gr oupings. In particular, the concentrati on of commercants
has a paradoxically different relationship to Poujadist voting
within the two groupings, Narmring the 61-64 group "Transitional"
and the over-65 group "Rural," we cross-tabulated "High-Low"
Poujadism with the number o, commercial establishments per 10,00C
capita. Table 3A indicatas that the concentration of commercial
establishments, li4'e. Poujadist voting, peaks in the "Transitional"
departments. Even within, the transitionals, there appears to bo
a relationship between commercial density and Poujadisin (3B).
But, in the rural departments (3C), the reverse occurs! Those
departments with a high commercial density had an extremely low
Poujadist vote.
TABLE 3
Poujadism, Moderizat ion and 0ommerce*







Size of Non-agricultural Populationt










3B Commerce and Poujadism
Rurals
Commercial establishments/ Poujadism
10,000 capita High Low
174-227
228-253






3C C ommerce and POu jad ism
Tran s it i onals
Commercial establishments/ P ou jad ism
10 ,000 capita High Low Total
174-227 1 2 3
223-253 4 3 7
25,14-348 b 0 4
1T
Continuation of Table 3 on next pagt
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3D Population G Modernization fOr Departments
of Hih Cormercial Densit (above 227).
Gain in Population 4.6-5 4  Rurals Transitionals
More than 1.21 2 8
Less than 1.25 11 3
* Source: I Les Etablissements Industriels
Artisanaux et Conmierclaux e e n Tis16.
Several factors appear to account for this reversal of be-
havior. In the rural departments high commercial density should
result from agricultural depopulation that leaves an over-
concentration of small enterprises, This situation, where
village life also deteriorates,presents little contrast with
modernity and thus a low Poujadist potential. The same phenomenon
should occur to a lesser extent with the transitionals, especially
in the more rural areas. But to this first factor must be added,
for the transitionals, increased concentrations resulting from
urban trading centers and the competitive introduction of new
and modern forms of enterprise. These additional factors provide
the necessary contrast for Poujadism. In this respect, the rosults
on population growth (Table 3D) yield positive evidence. The rural
departments of high cormercial density are stagnant with "Low"
Poujadism. The transitionals are expanding and Poujadist.
The foregoing results load to no inference about how commercants
actually voted. What the results show is that, for rural depart-
ments, the market position of commercants was not an important
factor in the overall Poujadist vote. Actually, commercial
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concentration, unlike the more general measures of growth, is
probably a poor indicator of overall expectation-satisfaction
imbalance, hence of Poujadism.
Much more important in determining outcomes in French
elections is the competition for votes between various extremist
parties. If one extremist party had previously channelled votes
based on attitudinal "dissociation" into their electoral coffer
in a particular departrment, It is likely that they would Work
vigorously to combat any competing extremist party seeking the
same "dissociational" votes, This should be especially true for
the Communist party, which operates through a permanent organ-
ization of committed militants to gain adherents of this type.
To examine the relationship of Poujadist vote to Communist
vote, the departments were classified "High" (201 and above) or
"Low" (below 201) Communist vote. Consistent with our hypothesis-
about the relationship, the average Poujadist vote in the "Low
Conmmunism" group was greater than that for "High Communism,"
10..7% in the first case and 8.1% in the second. This d.fference
is small, however, and inadequately represents a major distinction.13
Of the 13 "High Poujadist," Rural departments, only one is also
high on Communism. Thus, with one exception, the absence of a
high Communist vote was a necessary if not sufficient condition
for a high Poujadist vote. (The lack of sufficiency explains why
there is not a major difference between the averages.4 The
13 T-test not significant, but p(U)4 .0002
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result is illustrated by Table 4.
TABLE 4
Cmninism and Poujadism -- u Department1
High Poujadism Low Poujadiam
(12.5% and over) (Under 12.:57
High Communism
(20% and over) 1 15
Low Communism
(Under 20%) 12 14
Departments N=13 N=29
That a low Communist vote was not a sufficient condition for
a high Poujadist vote simply indicates that some departments were
low in "dissociation" and, hence, low in extremist voting oi both
the "Right" and "Left" extremes of the political continuum.
When the same relationship of Communism vs. Poujadism is
examined for the 14 transitional departments there is apparently
a paradox since the 7 departments with "High" Communism have an
average Poujadist vote of 14.3% as against 11.1, in the 7 "Low"
departments, The best statement here might be that there was no
relationship between the two votes in these departments as the
comparable fourfold table (Table 5) shows no distinction and only
a low level of significance was reached,14 What explains the
14 T-test not signiflant, p(U), two-tail, .10.
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paradox is that in the transitional departments Communism can have
an urban base without competing with Poujadism for rural or petit
bourgeois votes. This is confirmed by a study which shows that,
for the rural departments, the percentage of Communist vote is
correlated with the percentage of self-owned farms and uncorrelated
with the number of workers, while the reverse is true in the
transitional departments,15
TABLE 5
Communism and Pouadisu - Transitional Departments
High Foujadism Low Poujadism
(12.5% and over ) (Under 12.5%)
High Comrmunism




The results are best demonstrated by those departments that
are not only "high" on Communism but also high in commercial con-
centration (See Table 3A-III. for context). The four transitionals
of this type (Allier, Drome, Herault, Vaucluse) were all heavily
15 To be discussed in the author's forthcoming paper, "The
Communist Vote in France." See, for an elaboration of the general
point, G. A. Almond, The Apeals of Communism (Princeton, 1954)
and Hadley Cantril, The Politics of Desir New York, 1958)
Poujadist (respective percentages: 13,8, 14.0, 17.9, 22.IL)
contrast the six rurals (Bass" Alpes, Ardeche, Creuse, Lot, Lozero,
and Pyrennes-Orientales) were all low (respective percentages: 1IJ.,
12.2, no list, 9.7, 7.9, .
Drome, Herault, Vaucluse are names that redirect our interest,
to geographic factors, for these three departments are all members
of the communications network presented by the Rhone valley.
Indeed, Isbre, Gard, and the outlying circonscription of Bouches-
du-Rhone complete a belt of "High Ciommunism-High Poujadism." In
turn this belt is one of the most dynamic regions of France.
The dual extremism of the Rhone region is indicative of
what we have hypothesized to be a general "dissociation" from
the existing structure of power ("the system"),. The oppositionist
character of the region's electoral behavior is fairly consistent
in its actual voting record. Its votes consistently weakened the
centrist Fourth Republic; in 1962 the region also voted "Non" to
the Gaullist effort to stabilize a centrist Fifth Republic.
Among comrmercants, the most typical voting pattern probably has
been: De Gaulle a R.P.F. in 1951; Poujade In 1956; Be Gaulle in
1958; and a traditionai party (now an tout") in 1Y62.16 t the
Rhone is one of the "dynamic areas of France. Successful economics
apparently is no short-term panacea for oppositonist politics.
To leave the valle-y of the Rhone for the more rural portions
of Southern France, or for Northlwestern France, leads to a very
16 Data on this pattern will be presented in the authorTs
forthcoming report of a survey of bakers in the Vaucluse
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different picture of the interaction between Poujadism and
CoDmmunism. In this large block of rural departments, with an
absence of "High-High" situations, the Poujadists must be viewed
as mobilizers of new discontent In departments that were traditionally
anti-Communist. Since the Comunists have tended to remain strong
in the same rural departments from 1951 to 1956, tranesfers of
Communist votes to Poujadist candidates can only be a marginal
factor. If, in the 42 rural departments, the Communist vote ad-
vanced from 1951 to 1956 in only 2 of the 13 "High" Poujadist
departments, it did so in only 5 of the 16 "High" Communist de-
partments and 5 of the 14 "Low-Low" departments. Elsewhere, in
"High" Communist as well as "High" Poujadist departments, the
Communist vote was reduced. A factor much more closely allied
to the mobilization of new discontent--the Poujadist capacity to
benefit fromi a reduction of abstentions--seems of greater impor-
tance, as indicated in Table 6.
TABLE 6
1ure Poudjadism and Abstentions
Change In percentage of Poujadism
abstentions, 1951-1956 High Low Total
No change or advance 0 7 7
Reduction less than
national mean, 13% 4 15 19
Reduction more than, 137 _2 16
Departments 13 292
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Until now, our analysis has shown the general characteristics
of Poujadist departments in terms of demographic and economic
variables, and has shown how the French political structure
channelled the electoral expression of the movement. Can we now
find a specific issue that precipitated hard votes out of structural
possibilities?
Of particular interest are the results fur wine-growing.
Table 7 reflects how, at both rural and transitional levels of
development, the Poujadist vote in departments with over 10% of
the active population in wine-growing was some one and one-half
times that in departments with a smaller fraction of wine-growers.
If only the "Low" Coimmunism departments are considered, for the
rural departments, high wine-growers have almost twice the
Poujadist vote as low wine-growers.
Clearly, wine-growing represents a crucial dimension in
Poujadist voting, There are several reasons to think the relation-
ship is not spurious, First, the wine-growing districts are quite
diverse on other measures, Wine-growing departments appear in
near-equal proportions among transitional departments and rural
departments, There are even urban wine-growing departments (Gard)
with large Poujadist votes. The wine-growers are both Catholic
(Maine-et-Loire) and laic (Vauclusel, Their populations are both
declining (Aveyron) and rising (Tarn. It is unlikely that wine-
growing is correlated with a more basic factor, Among the sub-





per7: Wine Growers* (1951)
Active Population"' (19,54) Average Poujadist Vote
Greater than 10 "
Less than 10%
12,7 % N= 19
N= 22
Greater than 10












Alcoolisme, Alcoolisation (Paris, 19153),
Sully Lederman, Alcool,
Tableau 1.6.
** "Population active" (Labor f orce). Source: I.N.S.E.E. ,
Recensemnent General de la Popuation de Mai 1954, Resuitats du
Sondage Au 1/2CMB: Population Active: 1re Partie: ntructure~
Prfess~Dn e,(P 9 , 'bau'l.
:P(t) (.09, F(U) ( .05-
P(t)(.01, P(U)<11.01
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vote in wine-growing regions are the production crises linke6 to
government attempts to curb alcoholism and to control the boulIleurs
de cru. Finally, both Hoffman and Royer have shown how anti-
government propaganda utilized the wine-growers discontent during
the election campaign,17
Of the many "issues" in an election, only a few ever become
salient to the mass of voters, Apparently the alcohol nexus
achieved this order of saliency. There were over 1,000,000 wine-
growers in France in 1956. In some departments they were particu-
larly numerous, representing over 25% of the active population in
sDoie 15 departments. Obviously, their m6contentement would be
coimnunicated to co-4mmercants and jrtisans dependent on their trade.
Given that alcohol production had become an important focus for
anti-government sentiment, it was not difficult for Poujade to
give this sentiment electoral expr'ession. If Poujade. was seized
by the devil, it is not unlikely that the devil was incarnate in
Mendas-France,
t is interesting how completely Poujadist voting lacks any
rerecO to elite politics, Rather than following the usual
c onramilcation course fl owing out friom Paris to the provinces,
Poujadism took the reverse. Thero is strong evidence that
problems of the wine-alcohol industry had a dominant role in the
elections of 1956, yet these problems were never viewed as central
at the tIme and have hardly been posed as such since, Finally,
17 Hoffman, U, cit., p, 13; Royer, article in Les Paysans
et la Politique, _p. ci, p. 168-169.
102
the mrot offective political counterbalance to Pbujadism seems
to have been Communism, also an extremist movement excluded from
the elite "system." Poujadism was aiother political maze from
which the men of the Fourth Republic--in their "house without
windows"1 8 -- found no exit.
Poujade's Voters: Replicatin in Isbre
The conclusions we have drawn with the department as the
level of analysis would be reinforced if we could find the same
effects at the cantonal level. To examine voting at the cantonal
level, we have chosen to reanalyze the data for the department
of Isere, originally presented by M, Claude Leleu219
The Isre is an interesting case in point4 The Poujadist
vote was 15.6% and two Poujadist deputies were elected, although
Isere Is a "dynamic" department containing France's fastest
growing city, Grenoble. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from
,ho Aviysiso presentod here can be buttressed by contrast with
the conclusions drawn from a more classic analysis, M. Leleu
observed
if Poujadism generally attains its maximum level in
the poor agricultural regions and more rarely in the rich
cegions, .. it is nonetheless Interesting to observe that
the poorest regions were not those which gave the most
votes to the U.F.F.
Everywhere extremely pour, the South-East of the
department is the region the least penetrated by
Poujadism, And it is precisely in the most impoverished
canton of the department (Bourg-d'Oisans& that the U.F .F.
received its lowest percentage for rural cantons
18 The phrase used to describe its elite politics. C. Melnik
and N. Leites, The Hlouse Without Windows (Chicago, 1958).
..19 S ee n 1
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However, the results found in Table 7 suggest that poverty
is not the crucial variable. There we divided the 45 cantons
('excluding the cities of Grenoble and Vienne) into three groups
of equal size for three indicas used by M. Leleu, Non-agricultural
Population, Population Growth, and Agricultural Richness. For
example, the "High" group 'on Non-agricultural Population includes
those 15 cant ons with the highest percentages of the labor f orce
in nDn-agricultural occupations.
Along the dimensIons of population growth and non-agricultural
population, the Poujadist vote in "High" cantons is significantly
less than in both "Medium" and "Low" cantons. There are no im-
portant differences, however, between "Medium" and "Low" cantons.
This illustrates that, while Poujadism was basically a rural move-
ment, relrtive decline was as important a factor as absolute
decline, for the "Middle" group--with a stable population between
1936 ad 1954--voted as heavily Poujadist as the "Low" group in
pop&lation decline.
The importance of relative position in producing an im-
aalanced "want: get ratio"20 between expectations and satis-
factions, and consequently in explaining the Poujadist vote, is
emphasized by the results on'agricultural richness. Here the
"Medium" group, excluded from consideration by Leleu as a result
of his poor-rich dichotomy, has the highest Poujadist vote,
significantly greater than that in the poorest cantons.
20 See D. Lerner, "Towards a Communication Theory of Modern-
ization" in L. W. Pye, ed., Communications and Political Deveo-
ment (Princeton, 1963), pp. 333-335.
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A more valid test of the importance of agricultural richness
results when we confine our attention to those 12 cantons that
have more than 50% of the labor force in agriculture. In this
case, the six richest cantons have an average of 20.0 against
19.1 for the 6 poorest, Although this difference is not of
statistical significance, it is a subotantial distortion to
advocate the counter-hypothesis "Poujadism generally attains
its maximum level in the poor agricultural regions and more rarely
in the rich regions."
Nevertheless, there is one important factor that is revealed
by the study of geography. If we take the 10 cantons that lie
totally to the South-East side of a line drawn through Grenoble
perpendicular to the line Lyon-Grenoble, we find a Poujadist
average of 10,6% as against 17.9% in the remaining cantons.21
Furthermore, we obtain a similar result when only the 12 agricul-
tural cantons are considered--12.9% for the b4 Alpine cantons,
22.9% for the 8 cantons between Lyon and Grenoble. 2 2  These
differences, M. Leleu traces to a crisis in the textile industry.
But this crisis does not seem to be wholly explanatory when the
character of the results is similar between industrial and agri-
cultural cantons, We would hypothesize that Poujadism greatly
profited from the relative disparities reinforced by easy communi-
cation arising in the creation of the Metropolitan region
Lyon-Grenoble .
21 p(U) .002, p(t) .001
22 p(U) .025, p(t) .05
23 For the background of this discussion, see D. Lerner and
Raymond Aron, France Defeats E.D.C. (Praeger, 1957), pp. 201-208.
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In the context of this geographic element, the limits on
M. Leleu's criteria of agricultural richness must bo recalled,
In Isbre as a whole, agricultural productivity in 1951 excoeded
that of only six other departments while its industrial produc-
tivity is among the highest In France,214 Thus, cantonal
variations in agricultural productivity are not likely to be as
important for individual expectations as the gross disparity
between the industrial and agricultural sections. This disparity,
which once again involves "relative deprivation 2 5 rather than
absolute poverty, is heightened in the Bas-Dauphin,
The relationship of the Poujadist vote to the Communist
vote in Isere should be mentioned briefly. In Isert, as the
Comminist vote is stronger in the industrial than in the agricul-
tural cantons, it was possible to have large votes for both
brands of extremism. While the Comanist vote did drop soumewhat
more in the agriculturaL than in the industrial cantons, this
drop appears very marginal in the Poujadist picture. Drops in
abstention, Gaullist, Radical, and MR.P, votes all seem more
important. Thus, Poujadism again appears as a new mobilizer of
those who want to vote against Paris while not wanting to vote
for NOscow,
2L Etudes etrgnu L Espace Economique Franaise,
., gjitT7Turce).
25) See R K. Ierton, in R. K. Mierton and ?, FL r
ds., Continuitjes in Social Research (Glencoe, Illinois, 190).
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Conclusion
Foujadism, our research indicates, was most successful
electorally in those geographic units in the "transitional" sector
of economic growth, where a declining rural agricultural community
came into great contrast with a rising industrial society This
contrast was illustrated (because heightened) by a transitional
crisis involving the production of wine-and-liquor, which resulted
in a heavy Poujadist vote in the wine-growing departments, In the
less advanced departments, where the incidence of Poujadism was
more sporadic, the strength of the Communist vote greatly affected
the Poujadist vote. In these less advanced areas, the Poujadist
vote was also, but less strongly, correlated with a number of
variables that appear to affect the level of expectations as
contrasted with satisfactions: the "want: get ratio."
At The catitonal level, study of the department of IsAre
further suggested that contrast within the communications network
of a developing Metropolitan region may have been especially
conducive to a high Poujadist vote. Tndeed, the Bas-Dauphin
is a portion of a larger region, the Rhone valley, with a uni-
formly high level of extremist voting.
These results, the author believes, considerably reduce the
hesitation found in past studies of the electoral geography of
Poujadism as to the effects of absolute and relative levels of
economic development. As, it is further believed, the new results
were obtained by a significant difference in the methodology
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employed, it may be helpful to outline the differences in pro-
cedure.
First, as we started with an orientation toward relative
economic differences, the centers as well as the tails of distri-
butions were examined for maxima and minima. Thus, we arrived
at the conclusion that Poujadist voting was greatest in depart-
ments at intermediate levels of urbanization and industrialization
We thereby drew attention to the transitional character of
Poujadism. Next, not only was a single independent variable
compared to the voting distribution, but also the marginal
effects of a second variable were examined for various ranges
of the first independent variable. By this techiique, we found
the Importance of Coraunist voting and wine-growing for the
Poujadist vote in the rural departments. The additional in-
formation that was produced by these two relatively ninor
Innovations suggests that electoral geography could be raised
to a regional science by the application of modern statistical
analysis., The continually baffling character of French politics
clearly warrants the attempt.
THE CCWUNIST VCTE IN FRAME
An Analysis of Elemnts of Regional Variation
As a consequence of the events following the Russian Revolution, the
French Communist Party made its debut in 1919. By the elections of 1924,
the geographic distribution of its electoral strength was readily apparent.
Approximately, the distribution of 194 has been maintained down to the
present despite the intervention of the Great Depression and the World War. 1
An equivalent statement is that, from election to election, the P. C.
(Parti Communiste) has neither found a substantial number of new depart-
ments where the Communist percentage of the vote would approach the per-
centage in previous areas of success nor been driven from its by now
traditional bastions. In tun, the stability of performance suggests
that relatively stable features of the social structure can account for a
large part of the variations in strength from one department to another.
If, in contrast, the positions of Communist strength had gradually evolved
over time, we would be concerned with indicators of social change. But
the correct approach apparenitly involves a search for the milieu in which
the P. C. is likely to be successful. Our suggestion is that the appropriate
factor to characterize the milieu is found in urbanism and that a high
Comunist vote occurs from interactions of urbanism with other variables.
Under the hypothesis of interaction, we accordingly stratified tke
French departments with respect to urbanization and, in each stratum,
investigated the relationship between Comunist vote and other factors.
1. For cross-tabulations among various elections, see the Appendix.
109
Our findings are basically three-fold: first, in highly urban areas,
Communist vote correlates well with the percentage of the population not
employed in agriculture; second, in areas of medium urbanization, Com.
munist vote correlates well with the percentage of workers; finally, in
areas of low urbanization, Communist vote correlates with the percentage
of farms that are self-owned. The first two findings document what is
known as the "ceinture r (red belt) effect where workers tend to vote
less Communist in non-working class quarters than in working class quarters
and where non-workers tend to vote more Comunist in working class quarters
than in non-working class quarters.
Future analysis ill attempt to tie these findings together more
coherently by an analysis of variance of Couwist voting strength. Time
will be one dimension in this analysis.
In this forthcoming study, we will additionally attempt to demonstrate
that, region by region, Comunist voting has declined in France. Never-
theless, the Comunist vote at the national level remains a fairly stable
percentage of the whole. We believe this to be true because demographic
trends favor the urban areas where the Comunist vote Is now strong.
We would further hope to indicate that the Comunist vote is more
heavily related to the ecological pattern of the inter-war period than to
the current ecological pattern. A lack of adaptation to ecological change
plus a region 'y region decline would in turn suggest that the Communist
movement continues to exi3t more by its "organizational weapon" than by
ideological attractio.
To return to the present analysis, we began by asking what environments
or milieus ought to characterize high Communist voting. To characterize
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this milieu, sociologists have conducted a long but unsuccessful search for
a variable that would correlate highly with the percentage voting Comm-ist.
Thus, the P. C. obtains a high percentage in departments with both high and
low degrees of religious practice or both high and low percentages of
workers among the active population.
The technique of looking for a single variable is bound to fail since
it assumes that Communism attracts strongly in a unique type of environment
and that, therefore, the closer the actual environment approaches the pure
state (say 100% workers or 100% atheists) the higher the P. C. 's percentage.
On the contrary, what is obviously true is that Communist electoral success
occurs in radically different environments. In contrast to a linear rela-
tionship with a single variable, the Comunist vote is a function of the
interactions of single variables.
This is not to say, however, that we cannot find a commn psychic
characteristic to Comunist voters, whatever their surroundings may be.
A brief suggestion would be that the Communist voter everywhere experiences
(perceptually) non-participation with regard to the decisions made in the
French social system and/or the rewards distributed in that system.2
Once we agree to attach importance to a sense of non-participation it
becomes clear that we must investigate the possible cabinations of descrip-
tor variables (in opposition to one continuum) which will indicate environ-
ments conducive to a sense of non-participation and thereby Communist
2. Of course, the unsatisfied person could abstain as well as vote against
the system. A differentiation along this further dimnsion of voting
did not, however, appear necessary to the rather "first-order-of-
magnitude" voting analysis contained in this paper.
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voting. This with one caveat: the stability of the geographic distribution
indicates that the non-participation must be long-run. Discontent of the
Poujadist type, for erample, arising largely in relation to post-World
War U economic change, can be eliminated from consideration.
For such an investigation, the elections of 1956, which occurred rela-
tively close to the 1954 census, were chosen. It is quite justifiable to
restrict this introductory investigation to a single election, for, given
the stability of the geographic distribution and the stability of the rank-
order of the departments among the variables to be used in the analysis,
our results are likely to be applicable to most, if not all, legislative
elections in the period 194-1962. For example, even the identification of
the P. C. with the Resistance and the relative Franco-Soviet raprochement
of 1945-1947 did not result in a gross change in the geographic pattern for
the legislative elections of 1946. Thus, while the general level of the
Conmmnist vote may have been elevated by the above factors, it is reasonable
to hypothesize that its relative distribution among social groups was
largely unaltered. Keeping this hypothesis in mind, we can proceed to
locate the social structures favorable to a large percentage for the P. C.
in 1956.
A first objective should be to differentiate the departments by some
powerful descriptor of the social system that also has some mild correla-
tion with Communist voting. Such a separation would enable us to see if,
for an important feature of the environment held roughly constant, a
second variable (that need not be the same at different levels of the primary
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variable) can describe the structures typically conducive to Comunist
voting.
Strong candidates for the primary variable are urbanism and its cor-
relate, an index of modernization.3 Choice of this pair is indicated by:
1) thei: strength as differentiators among geographic unito in a devel-
oning natton like France; and 2) the historical association,
dating at least since ihe :evolution of 1789, betwcen uWba. non-participation
and the Left. Tables 1-4 indicate the presence of a mnld correlation
between both variables and the Communist vote.
The results for 1958 and 1962 have been included to show that the
basic tenor of the relationship holds regardless of the election--in each
case there is a distinct difference in performance between the most ("1"
and the least ("3") urban departments.. Nevertheless, it remains to elim-
inate a substantial number of the deviant cases by finding a second dis-
tinguishing variable within each level of urbanism or modernization.
The problem of finding the appropriate second variable will be dealt
with only for urbanism. Within the first two ranks on urbanism, it is not
3. The measure of urbanism used here is defined by the Institut National
de Statistique et Etudes Economigques (I.N.S.E.E.) as the percentage of
the population living in communes with 2000 or more people with residence
in the "chef-lieu." The index of modernization has been constructed
by Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden for a forthcoming paper. It consists
of a summntion of "ranks" on agricultural productivity, radios per
capita, and energy consumption per capita (see n.4).
4. In all the tables to follow, where matrix rows or columns are labelled
serially, the departments have been grouped into ranks by choosing a
segment of the rank-order. Thus "Modernization-1" in Table 1 includes
the 27 departments with the highest score on the modernzation index.
All the voting results are for the "premier tour."
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Table 1. Modernization and CaOMunism 5
CCOUsrMT VOTE (1956)













Table 2. Urbanism and Comunism--56
CaeMJIST VC01E (1956)













Table 3. Urbanism and Communism--58
CCIMNIST VOTE (1958)





































Table 4. Urbanism and Commmism--62
CCMIGT VKfE (1962)
Over 20% 10% to 20% Under 10% Total
1 19 13 2 34
2 14 13 1 33
3 7 11 5 23
Total 40 42 90
surprising that the variables relate to economic structure--within rank 1
it is the percentage of the labor force engaged in nn-agricultural occupa-
tions that sharpens our breakdown; in rank 2 it is the percentage of the
labor force classified as workers (Tables 5 and 6). It is interesting that
the procedure cannot be reversed. Neither does the non-agricultural percent-
age separate high P. C. vote from low P. C. vote departments in rank 1., nor
does the worker percentage separate in rank 2. This finding is rather
striking since the two measures are correlated. At least three possible
explanations should be considered.
One possibility is that the results are due to chance. This seems
unlikely since Chi-Square tests applied to Tables 5 and 6 showed both
significant at the .05 level. Another possibility is that the results are
spurious in the sense that a more fndamental variable (also involving
economic structure?) can replace the two used here and give a significant
breakdown in both ranks 1 and 2. While such a variable has not been found





Table 5. Non-agricultural labor force and Ceirmmism
CGSMUMIT V(YE (Urbanism "1"11 departments)
Over 24% 4 to 24% Total
EE in Over 88% 11 5 16
ultural
Tns U der 15 4 19 3




Table 6. Workers and cammism
CCSUKIST VOTE (Urbaniam "2" departments)
Over 16% 4% to 16% Total
Over ) 11 1 12
[Inder 14 10 21
Total 22 11 33
(one-tail .025)
Finally, as the third possibility to be considered, the results
suggest the following hypothesis: in rank 2 (between 32 and 45% urban)
non-vorkers in the non-agricultural labor force have much less tendency
to vote Crmmnist than the same class of people in rank 1 departments.
Furthermore, the difference in behavior between rank 1 and rank 2 is much
greater for non-workers than for workers. Such a condition my come about
because in the sml town or village expectations are more easily balanced
and participation more readily attained (less angie) for the non-workers.
It my also come about because workers tend to be concentrated in highly
urban environments whatever the average level of urbanization while a
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substantial tertiary sector must be maintained even in the amI1 ceammes.
(The preceeding would be especially true for workers employed in estab-
lishments of, say, over 50 persons.) While this hypothesis could account
for the results, it ill not be tested in this paper.
Before passing to a discussion of the most rural departments, one
should note the very good correlation between the workers' pereutsp in
the labor force and the percentage voting Cammist at Paris. Also at
Paris, a yorker is more apt to vote Coummist if he lives in a working-
class quarter than if he lives in a bourgeois quarter.6 The first result
is likely to be related to the fact that at Paris two of our other var-
iables, urbanization and the non-agricultural percentage of the labor
force, are held constant. Thus, the validity of the hypothesis that the
Commmist percentage is proportional to the workers' percentage (or any
single variate hypothesis) seems dependent on first obtaining a suffic-
iently homogeneous environment. The second result denmnstrates another
important feature of the environment that must eventually be specified--the
degree of segregation and concentration of working class residence.
To turn now to rank 3, the variable chosen has a radically different
base than those for ranks 1 and 2, for at a low level of urbanism it be-
comes natural to focus on agriculture. The rank 3 departments were
divided into two groups: one contains those departments in which either
"fermiers" (those who rent their farms) represented 50% or more of the
farms or "metaprs" (share-croppers) 25%; the other group includes the
6. See Joseph Klatzmann, "Comportement electoral et classe sociale, " in




remaining departments ("p2prietaires" in the majority or mixed). The
results are given in Table 7, for which the Chi-Square is significant at
the .01 level.
Tuable 'f. Agrculture and Communism
CM2U3NIST VOTE (Urbanism "3" Departments)
Over 14 Under 16 Total
Self-owned 9 4 13
FA
Not Self-owned 2 8 10
Total 11 12 23
The explanation of these results has been ably sensed by Jacques
Fauvet:
Lee regions de faire-valoir direct sont essentiellement situes
au sud de la Loire. La se trouvent a la gois la plus forte pop-
ulation paysanne, les exploitations les plus petites, le plus
faible revenu agricole. A quoi s'ajoutent, sauf dans la plusfaible pratique religieuse et le plus bas taux de natalite.
Or, les regions du Centre, du Sud-Ouest et du Sud-Est ont
toujours vote le plus l gauche possible: montagnard, republicain,
puis radical, socialiste, enfin communiste.
A ce comportement de la petite et moyenne propriete, il peut
etre propose deux explications:...
(While a condition for a Commist vote among thc farmers may be a
general level of poverty, etc., none of the other factors Fauvet mentions
gave a 2x2 table significant at the .05 level for the Commm-ist vote in
rank 3. Therefore, his analysis of the economic aspects will be omitted.)
...-- l'une sociale: la structure 9galitaire do la petite propriete
et son anciennete sont propices aux votes democratiques, voire
revolutionnaires. Bien que possedant sea moyens de travail et
no souffrant apparemment daucune alienation, le petit proprietaire
ci. aita.liote a sa maniere, n'en a pas les reflexes politiques.
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Ne subissant depuis plusleurs generations aucune sujetion sociale
ou religieuse, rien ne le retient de se porter aux extremes, sur-
tout si sa condition economique l'y pousse. Il existe ainsi dans
des regions rurales une tradition drmocratique ancienne....7
To rephrase Fauvet's analysis, the level of expectations (especially
with regard to democratic participation and its anticipated revards) are
considerably higher in regions where farmers tend to own their fans than
in regions where farmers are renters or share-croppers. The failure of
succeeding regimes to bring satisfaction to these expectations witnessed
a movement leftward from those parties which became identified with power--
first the Radicals, then the Socialists. In turn it is interesting that
these expectations appear conditioned not by income levels but by the
organization of economic comnunications.
Having now found, for each of the three levels of ur'banism, a measure
that correlates with the percentage of the Commminst vote, we should now
conclude by mentioning that none of these three measures gives a breakdown
of similar significance vhen applied to all 90 departments. This fact
should not, as it has in the past, cause us to reject these measures into
limbo with regard to the analysis of French Corxmmism. Rather, the results
cause us to re-emphasize the importance of urbanism in the social environment.
7. Jacques Fauvet, "Le monde paysan et la politique, " in Fauvet and
Henri Mendras, eds., Les Pay et la Politique (Paris, 1958),
pp. 9-10.
8. The totality of the results are also valid for the elections of 1946,
1951, and 1958. The results are not significant for 1962. Whether
this is a result of changes in the distribution of the measures we
have been using or a consequence of a mjor change in voting habits
will not be clear until the results of the 1962 census have been




































































B. CoMr1son of Results,
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Over 20% Under 20%
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D. CMaparison of Results for Urbanism 3
1962
Over 10% Under 10%
Self-owned 6 7
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Each of the case stulies treats different political phenomena, but
each illustrates common tbmen that have appeared througbout the study.
We have noted the failure of traditional categories based on natural
regions to account for French development and have seen instead the spread
of urban regions and the spread of the modern lifestyle throughout France.
The political concomitants of these developments are illustrated by the
E.D.C. test case vhich shows that the urban variable aids in the under-
standing of the failure of E.D.C. The association of Commmism with urban
voting patterns in the Assembly played a key role in the defeat.
Still another political concomitant of the spread of urban lifeways
is seen in the study of the Poujadist movement. The raising of expecta-
tions through commication with an urban region, and the failure to make
the process proceed at an acceptable rate are factors in the national
movement which surprised political analysts and has not even now been
adequately explained.
The pattern of the Ccxmmzist vote in France is more readily under-
stood when the urban dimension is added. Cnimmiat voting is not a simple
function of the urban-rural dichotomy, but different levels of urbaniam,
when combined with other variables, nets a better explanation than cn
be bad by the application of traditional concepts.
In each of the cases, the addition of new concerns for the analyst




expanation. he work of this study has only begun and is more suggestive
than definitive at this time. However, in every case, the expectations
which have been fostered by the traditional categories have been disap-
pointing. The continued disappointment is an indication that we are
vorking with false expectations. Changes in modern France require changes
in categories of analysis--especially the inclusion of the urban regions
as a fact of modernization,
While the urban environment still accounts for much of the present
regional variation in France, the sharpness of the rural-urban split is
being eroded by a process of homogenization of French stanands of living.
Although we do not know the extent to vhich the spread of the urban
regions is responsible for the homogenization of France and the spread of
the new lifestyle, we are sure they play a substantial role in bringing
modernity to a rural population and' in erasing regional diversities.
The case studies have demonstrated that accounting for the urban
dimennion of modern life is crucial for the explanation of important
aspects of modern French behavior. They have also shown that urbanism
itself is a complex factor. Different levels of urbanism make a difference
in behavior patterns. The implications of urbanism can also vary when
still other factors are present and operating within the urban environment.
The significance of the case studies and of the report as a whole lies in
its application of new factors to explain the new facts of modern French
life.
